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Abstract 
Many organisations and individuals installing wireless local area networks 
(WLANs ), which are based on the IEEE 802.11 b standard, have little 
understanding ofthe security issues that surround this technology. 
This study was initiated to determine how WLAN security issues affect 
organisations in Perth, Western Australia. The scope of the study was 
restricted to 802.llb WLANs operating in infrastructure mode, where all 
traffic is transmitted by wireless access points (APs). 
This study was conducted in two phases. The general aims of the first 
phase were to determine the number of detectable WLANs in the Perth 
Central Business District (CBD) and subsequently, the percentage of them 
that have enabled Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). Additionally, phase 1 
was able to show how many WLANs were still using the manufacturer's 
default settings and how the network devices may be grouped according to 
manufacturt!r. 
The general aims of the second phase were to find out if the IT managers of 
various Perth organisations were aware of the security issues related to 
WLANs and to find out the degree to which the security tools and 
processes have been implemented. These aims were also achieved and in 
addition, anecdotal infonnation was collected and analysed. 
The results of this study indicate that in the Perth CBD, the majority of 
those persons responsible for the implementation and management of 
wireless networks are aware of the problems and have taken steps to secure 
their netwo;ks. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The bac'kground to the study 
Wire1es5 Local Area Networks (WLANs) may be deployed by 
organisations who want to network devices such as desktop computers, 
laptop computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs). WLANs may 
also be implemented in situations where cabling is difficult or impossible 
or where there are restrictive covenants on making structural changes to 
the building, for example a heritage listed building. 
802.11b WLANs are wireless networks that are made up of components 
that confonn to the 1999 IEEE 802.11 b standard They are also known as 
Local Area Wireless Networks or LAWNs. 802.llb components operate 
in the 2.4 GHz radio frequency and typically have a range of 50 to 65 
metres indoors (Kershaw, 2002). This range increases to 400 metres in an 
open or outdoor area (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). With the addition of 
a high-gain antenna and an amplifier, the outdoor range can extend to 32 
kilorn.etres (Maxim & Pollino, 2002, p. 48). 
WLANs may operate in either infrastructure or ad hoc mode. 
Infrastructure mode is where all network traffic is transmitted by wireless 
access poir.~s (APs). These access points are connected to other network 
devices such as servers. Ad hoc mode is where the wireless network cards 
talk directly to each other without going through an access point. 
The scope of this study has been restricted to 802.11 b WLANs that are 
operating in infrastructure mode. 
The Gartner Group (cited in Barnes et al., 2002, p. 4) has predicted (with a 
0.7 probability) that by 2005, 50 percent of Fortune 100 companies will 
have deployed wireless LANs that will operate in either infrastructure or 
ad hoc mode. 
Figure 1 below shows the projected number of wireless Internet users in 
2005 as predicted by the Yankee Group (cited in Barnes et al., 2002, p. 4). 
·_(/ 
500 
-
400 
0 
c 
:g 300 ~ 
E 
.E 
- 200 !!! 
" 0 ::> 
100 
0 
195.2 
North 
America 
466 7 
313.3 
118.7 
86 
Europe Asia Latin Africa and 
America Middle East 
Figure 1 ~ Projected number of wireless internet users in 2005 
WLANs are becoming popular because: 
• they improve the productivity of staff (Wireless LAN Benefits Study, 
2001); 
• the hardware required is relatively inexpensive compared to traditional 
fixed networks (Intel, 2001; Ellison, 2002; Young, 2001); 
• no cabling is needed. Installation problems in locations where network 
cabling would be difficult or impossible are thereby overcome. For 
example, a building may have restrictive covenants that would prevent 
the tenants from making structural changes such as drilling holes in 
walls; 
• they are easier to set up out-of-the-box than wired networks (Ellison, 
2002); 
• they improve the portability of components like laptop computers 
(Verisign, 2002); and 
• they improve the expandability of a network as additional users and 
access points may be added easily (Whitney, 2001). 
2 
WLANs usc radio frequency (RF) signals to transmit and receive data. As 
is the nature of RF, the signals arc broadcast in an cmnidircctional pattern 
into the ether. Many people believe that data transmitted by an access 
point stops when it encounters a physical barrier such as a wall or window 
(Ellison, 2002; Mills, 2002). The wireless transmission medium contrasts 
with traditional wired networks where the data signals arc conveyed via 
cables that arc protected by the physical boundaries and access controls of 
the building. The differences bct\vecn wireless and wired networks mean 
that WLANs suffer from security concerns, such as eavesdropping and 
bandwidth theft, that arc not readily present in wired networks. 
Several types of attacks may be perpetrated against WLANs. The most 
basic is a passive attack that exploits the situation where a large number of 
WLAN administrators have not enabled the default security (Ellison, 
2002). There is currently no way to detect someone who is passively 
monitoring your network (Savage, 2001). An active alt~lck takes 
advantage of the flaws in the built-in Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
encryption. These flaws a~!ow attackers to connect, perhaps unnoticed, to 
a WLAN in order to read, modify or inject data onto the network. To 
detect the presence of a h~cker., the network administrator wou!d require a 
"properly laid-out network and direction-finding equipment" otherwise an 
attacker could remain "anonymous and hidden anywhere in the wireless 
coverage area" (Maxim & Pollino, 2002, p. 54). 
WLANs arc susceptible to 'man-in-the-middle' (MITM) attacks plus 
Denial of Service (DoS) and flooding attacks. MITM attacks occur where 
malicious users logically situate themselves between a source and a target 
(Barnes eta\., 2002, p. 33). Maxim and Pollino (2002, p. 49) describe the 
MITM attack as follows: ''The attacker sends out unsolicited ARP 
(Address Resolution Protocol] replies to target stations on the [W]LAN. 
The targets will send all traffic to the attacker instead of the intended 
destination and the attacker wilt then fonvard the packets to their 
originally intended destination". 
DoS and flooding attacks in WLANs may be trigg1~red deliberately or 
accidentally. Two ways that the network may be deliberately rendered 
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useless are by an attacker flooding the WLAN with tra·asmissions or by 
hijacking an access point. 
Accidental OoS events may be triggered by having too many WLANs in a 
small area or by interference from other devices operating at the same 
frequency, for example cordless phones and microwave ovens (Barnes et 
a!., 2002, p. 226). 
In summary, insecurely configured WLANs present a threat to the 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of network data. Unless a bn.:·lch 
is detected, risks may go unnoticed by many WLAN operators due to a 
lack of awareness of security issues. 
1.2. The significance of the study 
WLAN security is a significant issue in the context of computer and 
network security, in that the data of some orga11isations may be at risk due 
to a lack of awareness of WLAN security implications. Discovering how 
these issues affect organisations in the Perth CBD is the main objective of 
this study. Couzins (2002) states that security experts are concerned at the 
"disparity between the amount of wireless network activity in the 
corporate community and the low level of awar('ncss of the vulnerability 
of radio local area networks". 
Many of the features that make WLANs appealing give rise to major 
security concerns: for example, because of the ease with which WLANs 
may be installed, non-technical staff may implement them without having 
any understanding of the security implications. In Australia, Mills (2001) 
cites that around 60 percent of organisations running WLANs have not 
enabled the standard's built-in WEP encryption. As Mackenzie (2002a, 
p.l) s:atcs "Many organisations arc enjoying the benefiis of wireless 
technology without fully understanding the new network security issues it 
raises". 
Even with WEP encryption enabled, a network may be at risk because that 
encryption may be cracked in less than 15 minutes (WEP: ready in 15 
minutes, 2001; AirSnort Tool Cracks WEP in 15 minutes, 2001) though in 
practice it generally takes several hours to capture enough data to be able 
to crack WEP. Requiring WEP does however raise the minimum skill 
4 
level that is needed to intercept and read wireless data (Andress, 2002) and 
WEP "remains an adequate mechanism for [the] prevention of casual 
eavesdropping" (Wireless DeMilitarized Zone (WDMZ), 2002). 
Security problems arise when a default or out·of-the-box installation is 
performed because the vendor's default settings generally sacrifice 
security in favour of functionality and ease of installation (Cohen, 2001; 
De Spiegeleire, 2001; Wireless LANs unprotected in London, 2002}. 
Mills (2001) gives the following as examples of default settings that are 
detrimental to the security of a network: 
• The default network name of many wireless access points is the 
vendor name. 
• The default encryption key for every vendor is available on the 
Internet. 
Out-of.the-box installations are commonplace according to Barnes et ul. 
(2002, p. 204) who noted that when people install new equipment they 
generally do just enough to make it work and then never touch it again 
once it is operational. Barnes has found that "nearly 40 percent of 
WLANs had yet to change their configuration from the factory default" 
(ibid, 2002, p. 315). 
Another major issue arises where the WLAN is connected to an internal 
wired network, creating a hybrid network of wireless and wired 
components. Logically interfacing wireless access points with an existing 
wired network could open up the extended system to wireless hackers 
(Stewart, 2000). The ease with which WLANs may be installed has meant 
a number of unauthorised or 'rogue' WLANs being implemented by users 
in some organisations, without the knowledge of the systems 
administrators (Leyden, 2001; Brewin, 2002). Most networks rely on 
firewalls for perimeter security and "are not prepared for an attack from an 
insider" (Maxim & Pollino, 2002, p.54). 
'Rogue' access points may also be set up by attackers. The legitimate 
users of the WLAN might "unknowingly connect to this false AP and 
divulge sensitive credentials such as authentication information" (Maxim 
& Pollino, 2002, p.54}. An example of an attacker setting up a rogue 
access point was reported in October 2002 (Cox, 2002}. The access point, 
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which was situated outside a building, ~1ppeared as an official access point 
on the corporate wireless LAN. 
Very little expenditure or technir.al knowledge is required to attack a 
WLAN, as many of the tools are inexpensive and readily available, for 
example, antennae can be made using empty potato chip containers or tin 
cans by following instructions available on the Internet (Fiickenger, 2001). 
Such attacks usually employ a technique known as "war driving" (Shipley 
2001). The origin of this term is a practice called "war dialling" where an 
attacker dials a range of phone numbers until a modem answers (Andress, 
2002). 
Essentially, war driving transpires when an attacker connects the required 
tools and then drives around in his or her car attempting to locate WLANs. 
According to Gast (2002), such location is easy. At regular intervals, the 
network's wireless access points send unencrypted broadcast messages, 
called beacon management frames, which contain network information. 
Depending on the strength of the signal and the range of the antenna, these 
frames may be detected from up to 30 kilometres away (Pollino, 2002). 
In August 2002, a war driver from Western Australia conducted a war 
flying experiment during which he flew a small plane at an altitude of 500 
metres above the city of Perth. During this experiment, he detected 187 
wireless access points (Brewin, 2002). 
The tools that are required to perpetrate an attack are: 
• a laptop computer; 
• a wireless network interface card; 
• some software e.g. Netstumbler; 
• an antenna; and 
• a global positioning system (GPS) device (optional). 
This research is significant because there has been an increase in the usage 
and reliance on wired and wireless networks. The commercial 
confidentiality of some organisations may be at risk due to their lack of 
awareness ofWLAN security implications. 
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1.3. The purpose of the study 
It was hoped that the study would provide groundwork for higher level 
study, therefore it was conducted using inductive research methodologies 
(see section 2.4.1 and Appendix A). The study was conducted in two 
distinct phases. 
By conducting the first phase of the study, it was possible to detect the 
presence or absence ofWLANs operating in the Perth CBD (see Appendix 
C for scan route) and to detennine the percentage of those detectable 
networks that have the built-in WEP encryption enabled. 
The second phase of the study detennines the level of knowledge of 
WLAN security issues in selected (see section 3.2.1) Perth organisations. 
The results of each phase were then compared to the results of other 
studies that were similar to the current study (see sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). 
The results of the research will give an overall picture of the state of 
WLAN security in Perth. 
1.4. Research questions 
As this was an inductive study (see 2.4.1 and Appendix A}, no specific 
hypothesis was being tested. However, some general questions were 
answered during the two phases of the study. 
Phase 1: 
• How many 802.11 b WLANs are detectable in the Perth CBD? 
• What is the percentage of detectable infrastructure-mode WLANs 
that have enabled the WEP encryption? 
Phase 2: 
• Are IT managers aware of the full extent of the security issues 
related to WLANs? 
• To what degree have the appropriate and readily available security 
tools and processes been implemented? 
7 
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2. Review of the literature 
2.1. Literature on the background of the study 
The number of texts that have been published regarding the security of 
wireless networks is small but increasing. Several books have described 
the security issues relating to wireless technology. However, a large part 
of'Theitcontent concerns technology that is not relevant to this study, for 
example cellular telephone technology. The author has been able to 
identify only three texts written specifically about the security of wireless 
LAN technology, and has only been able to gain access to one. This text is 
discussed in section 2.1.1 below. The remaining background information 
was discovered in hard copy or electronic journals and on Internet sites. 
The background literature may be separated into three categories: 
• general infonnation about the security ofWLANs; 
• information on the flaws in the WEP encryption algorithm; and 
• infonnlition related to the tools and techniques used for detecting 
and possibly attacking WLANs. 
2.1.1. General information about the security ofWLANs 
Many articles and reports have been published regarding the 
general security of WLANs. "Hack proofing your Wireless 
Network" was published in 2002 by a group of six authors 
(Barnes et at., 2002) who are mainly network security consultants. 
Briefly, the text covers security issues and countermeasures 
relating to 802.llb WLANs. 
The security issues covered in the Barnes text include the 
published WEP flaws (see section 2.1.2 below) as well as issues 
related to poorly configured networks. Countermeasures offered 
include several which might be implemented immediately with no 
monetary outlay, but also extend to measures that are more 
sophisticated. These additional measures should be put in place 
to protect critical or sensitive data transmissions. Barnes claims 
that it is possible to implement and maintain a highly secure 
WLAN however "many will rush to implement these solutions 
without spending time to understand all of the possible threats and 
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security precautions that should be taken to mitigate them. As a 
result, misconfigurations will likely result in the downfall of 
security ... " (Barnes et al., 2002, p. 33) 
Before the Barnes text was published, several papers claimed that 
802.111:; compliant WLANs could not be made secure without the 
implementation of third party solutions. 
In March 2000, Simon, Ababa and Moore (2000) from Microsoft 
delivered a presentation to the 802.11 working group entitled 
"IEEE 802.11 Security and 802.1X" in which they discus.3ed 
several theoretical vulnerabilities of 802.11 networks including 
user identification impersonation, packet spoofing, passive 
monitoring and global keying issues such as IV reuse. 
In March 2001, a paper entitled "Your 802.11 Wireless Network 
has no clothes" was published by the University of Maryland 
{Arbaugh et al., 2001). The paper described the weaknesses of 
802.11 b access control mechanisms, and a "simple eavesdropping 
attack" against the 802.11 specified shared key authentication 
mechanisms. The paper concluded, ''ALL of the deployed 802.11 
wireless networks are at risk of compromise" and recommended 
that there be "a major overhaul of the current standard" (Arbaugh, 
Shankar & Wan, 2001, p.ll-12). 
In September 2002, the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
released a report entitled "Wireless Network Security" 
(Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). The report gives an overview of 
wireless technologies, followed by detailed information 
concerning the problems with 802.11b security, including 
mitigators and countenneasures to deal with these problems. 
Later that month, the U.S. Presidential Administration released a 
draft report entitled ''The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace" (2002) intended for federal departments and 
agencies. In this report, the Bush government asked federal 
agencies to exercise extra caution when using a WLAN and 
recommended that they install more encryption than would be 
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necessary on a wired network. The report referred to the NIST 
document and recommended that "agencies . . . carefully review 
the recent NIST report on the use of wireless technologies and 
take into account NIST recommendations and findings". 
Several papers have recommended the implementation and usage 
of Demilitarised Zones (DMZs) together with Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) technology to secure WLANs. A frequently 
recommended solution is to place all of the wireless access points 
in a de~militarised zone (DMZ) which is then attached to a Virtual 
Private Network (VPN) server (Stewart, 2000; Lancaster, 2002; 
Intel, 2001; Szerszen, 2001). Gartner recommends that 
organisations use VPNs on all WLAN connections (Leyden, 
2001). 
Webb (2002) found that "using a DMZ solves the problem of 
opening up the wired network to wireless hackers while the VPN 
technology is used to improve the authentication and encryption 
of network data, thus solving the problems with WEP. This 
combined solution is preferable to adding encryption on its own 
as the encryption is integrated into the product and is generally 
invisible to the end user." 
2.1.2. WEP flaws 
The 802.11 b standard defines the WEP algorithm as "a fonn of 
electronic codebook in which a block of plaintext is bit~wise 
XORed with a pseudorandom key sequence of equal length. The 
key sequence is generated by the WEP algorithm" (cited in 
Barnes et al., 2002, p, 205). XOR or "exclusive or" is a 
mathematical operator that returns true if one and only one of its 
operands is true. The key sequence generation process may be 
seen below in Figure 2 taken from Barnes et al. (2002, p. 205). 
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WEP vl.O was designed to use static 40~bit keys; this is generally 
referred to as 40-bit WEP. The restriction on the key length was 
imposed because WEP vl.O was developed at a time when the US 
Government treated the export of encryption software in the same 
way as it treated the export of weapons of mass destruction (Gast, 
2002). At that time, the longest exportable key length was 40 
bits. WEP v2.0 allows for key sizes up to 104 bits. WEP v2.0 is 
often referred to as 128~bit WEP but this name is misleading. It 
infers that the encryption key will be 88 bits longer than a 40-bit 
WEP key. In fact it is only 64 bits longer because 24 bits of the 
128~bit WEP key are the initialisation vector (IV). With 40~bit 
WEP, the bits of the IV have not been included in the bit count. 
If 40-bit WEP is used, then a 40~bit secret key is combined with a 
24~bit initialisation vector (IV) to create a 64~bit RC4 key. If SO· 
called 128~bit WEP is used, then a 104~bit secret key is combined 
with a 24~bit N to create a 128~bit RC4 key. The RC4 key is 
used to seed the pseudo-random number generator that generates 
a keystream equal to the length of the frame body plus the IV. 
The keystream is then XORed with the frame body and the IV to 
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encipher it. The IV is placed in plaintext in the header of the 
frame, as the receiver must know the IV in order to decipher the 
m~ssage. 
Many papers detailed problems with the WEP encryption 
protocol. The main design goal of the WEP protocol was to 
provide data privacy to a level equivalent to that of a wired 
network (WEP Security Statement, 2001). Several authors have 
demonstrated that this goal has not been met. 
In October 2000 Jesse Walker from Intel Corporation published 
"Unsnfe at any key size; an analysis of the WEP encapsulation". 
Walker stated that the "802.11 design community ... repeatedly 
suggests, asserts and assumes" the notion that WEP may be made 
safe by increasing its key size from 40 bits to 128 bits. He 
demonstrated that this assumption is invalid because the problem 
is with the initialisation vector (IV), not the key length. "It is 
infeasible to achieve privacy with the WEP encapsulation by 
simply increasing the key size" (Walker, 2000). Walker pointed 
out that the main weakness of WEP is the fact that it reinitialises 
the encrypted data stream every time a data collision occurs. 
Someone eavesdropping on wireless communications may 
capture the initialisation vector (IV) infonnation transmitted with 
each frame and, in a matter of hours, have all the data needed to 
recover the WEP key. The NIST paper 'Wireless Network 
Security' (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002) described this problem: 
"The IV is part of the RC4 encryption key. The fact that an 
eavesdropper knows 24-bits of the packet key, combined with a 
weakness in the RC4 key schedule, leads to a deadly analytic 
attack that recovers the key after intercepting and analysing only a 
relatively small amount of traffic". 
In January, 2001 a paper published by a team from the University 
of California at Berkeley documented several security flaws in the 
WEP protocol "stemming from misapplication of cryptographic 
primitives" (Borisov et al., 2001). This paper showed several 
practical attacks that demonstrated why the RC4 stream cipher 
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was a poor algorithm choice for encrypting wireless 
communications, and that using a CRCM32 checksum, designed to 
detect random errors in a message, is not suitable for the detection 
of intentional modifications to messages. The authors felt that 
RC4 and CRCM32 were chosen for their speed and ease of 
implementation and that the security community was not 
consulted regarding the suitability of using them. 
In response to publications describing the research done at the 
University of Maryland and at Berkeley, Steve Bellovin, who is a 
security expert and researcher at AT&T Labs stated "the security 
breaches discovered by the two universities are 'minor' because it 
would take a fairly sophisticated intruder to exploit them" (cited 
in Miller, 2001, p.l8). In tum, his statement was soon shown to 
be false. 
In August 2001, three scientists, from Cisco and the Weizmann 
Institute in Israel, published a paper entitled "Weaknesses in the 
Key Scheduling Algorithm ofRC4" (Fluhrer et al., 2001). Their 
paper described two significant weaknP.sses in the Key 
Scheduling Algorithm (KSA) of RC4 upon which WEP is based. 
The KSA is the mechanism that extends a short key into a key the 
length of the frame body. The first weakness is the existence of 
"large classes o. weak keys". These classes occur when certain 
values of the IVs allow an attacker to reconstruct the encryption. 
The second weakness is related to the first and applies when part 
of the key is exposed to an attacker. As the IV is transmitted in 
plaintext in every WEP packet, an attacker knows at least 24-bits 
of each RC4 key. 
The paper goes on to describe a theoretical ciphertext Monty attack 
based on these two weaknesses in the KSA. This theoretical 
attack is described by Schenk et al. (2001) as being "completely 
passive and therefore impossible (currently] to detect". 
The theoretical attack, described by Fluhrer et al. in their 
"Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4" paper, 
was soon realised by staff of the AT&T Labs in New Jersey, who 
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successfully implemented an attack based purely on their 
description. The AT&T Labs researchers felt that the designers of 
the WEP protocol "did not have a strong grounding in 
cryptography and security" and were not aware of the 
recommendations of the developers of RC4 regarding its correct 
implementation (Stubblefield et al., 2001). 
Though the researchers did not release their source code, tools for 
breaking WEP keys, based on the Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir 
attack, were soon publicly available. One of these tools is called 
"AirSnort". It has been reported to be capable of retrieving a 128-
bit WEP key in fifteen minutes. In September 2001, the Wireless 
Ethernet Compatibility Alliance (WECA), the developers of 
WEP, released a statement acknowledging the results of the work 
of the researchers from Berkeley and AT&T and recommended 
that organisations implement VPN technology to secure their 
WLANs (WEP Security Statemen~ 2001). 
It is generally understood within the IT community that the three 
goals of computer security are confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity. Gast (2002, p.89} points out that WEP fails to meet 
all of these goals. Confidentiality cannot be assured because of 
flaws in the RC4 encryption cipher. Integrity cannot be assured 
because the integrity check used is only efficient at detecting 
single-bit errors. Authenticity cannot be assured because the 
authentication that occurs is of the Media Access Control (MAC) 
address of the device, not the actual user. A MAC address is an 
address that, theoretically, uniquely identifies each hardware node 
of a network. 
At the end of October, 2002 the WiFi Alliance, formerly known 
as WECA, released a press statement announcing that it was 
developing a standards-based security solution to replace WEP 
(WiFi Alliance Announces Standard, 2002). Originally called 
WEP2 and then TKIP, WiFi Protected Access (WPA) has taken 
the sections of 802.1li that are ready for deployment and may be 
implemented in software. This is an interim measure designed to 
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bridge the gap left by WEP while the IEEE continue to work on 
the forthcoming 802.lli standard, itself due for release in late 
2003. 
Even though WPA has not been releaseti, c>. vulnerability has 
already been identified that will make WPA susceptible to a 
particular type of Denial of Service (DoS) attack (Batista, 2002). 
This attack is executed by a perpetrator sending just two packets 
of unauthorised data within a one-second period. The system 
believes itself to be under attack and shuts itself down (The 
Michael Vulnerability, 2002) 
2.1.3. Detecting and/or attacking insecure WLANs 
Many statistics have been published regarding the percentages of 
WLANs that have not enabled WEP. In late 2001, a security 
consultant from Sydney University completed a scan of the 
Sydney Central Business District (CBD) and found that "more 
than 80 percent of corporate wireless networks had no security 
whatsoever" (Mackenzie, 2002). In early 2002, a journalist from 
PC Magazine conducted a similar scan in areas of New York, 
New Jersey, Boston, and California. He found that only about 39 
percent of the networks surveyed had WEP encryption enabled 
(Ellison, 2002). Also in early 2002, a British security 
organisation called I-SEC conducted a similar scan in London. 
The survey found that "over two thirds of networks were taking 
no measures of protection" (Wireless LANs unprotected in 
London, 2002). 
The method these scans employed is essentially "war driving" 
(see Appendix A). War driving has been described by many 
journalists, though to date neither academic nor govenunent 
publications have been located by the a•;.thor. 
Though the war driving technique is a method used by hackers to 
attack WLANs, the process may be conducted in such a way that 
no sensitive data may be obtained (Rothberg, 2002). War driving 
may be either passive or active depending on the software used 
and how it is configured. 
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For example, Netstumbler software may be used to detect the 
presence ofWLANs; but it does not offer packet capture (Schenk 
eta!., 2001). 
Sniffing is a technique used to eavesdrop on network 
communications. Gast (2002, p.S.) describes sniffing on a 
wireless network, compared to sniffing on a wired network, as 
being "much easier because the radio transmissions are designed 
to be processed by any receiver within range". This range may be 
anything up to 32 kilometres if the attacker has employed 
antennae and amplifiers, which enable the attacker to be a 
considerable distance away from the target during an attack 
(Maxim & Pollino, 2002, p. 48). 
Maxim and Pollino (ibid, p. 49) describe the primary goals of an 
attacker as follows: 
"The attacker needs to understand:-
• who uses the network; 
• what is accessible; 
• what the capabilities of the equipment on the network are; 
• when it is used least and most; and 
• what the coverage area is". 
2.2. Literature on previous findings 
To date, the author has been unable to locate any published results of 
university or government research into the implementation and usage of 
WLANs. However, several market research studies have been conducted. 
In autumn, 2001, research was conducted by NOP World Technology on 
behalf of CISCO Systems to detennine the levels of take-up of WLAN 
technology and to provide "insight into the perceived benefits of wireless 
LAN implementation" (Wireless LAN Benefits Study, 2001, p. 4). This 
research found that 10 percent of U.S. organisations have either tested or 
deployed WLAN infrastructure (ibid, 2001, p.4). 
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2.2.1. Findings similar to phase 1 of this study 
In "an effort ... to generate awareness of the need by individual 
users and companies to secure their access points" (Worldwide 
War Drive FAQ, 2002), security professionals and hobbyists from 
several countries took part in two separate large-scale WLAN 
scans dubbed 'Worldwide War Drive I' (WWWDI) and 
'Worldwide War Drive II' (WWWD2). The first scan took place 
in early September and the second in late October, 2002. These 
scans found that on average 29 percent of WLANs located had 
not enabled the built-in encryption. See section 4.1.9 for a 
comparison of the results from phase 1 of this study to the results 
of the two Worldwide War Drives. 
2.2.2. Findings similar to phase 2 of this study 
In April 2002 SECURE Computing, which ts a UK-based 
computer security magazine, conducted market research into 
wireless security trends (Tullitt, 2002). There were 314 
respondents to this study, most of whom were in computer 
management roles. As it was a computer security magazine, it 
may be deduced that the respondents have some prior knowledge 
of computer security and were perhaps aware of the security 
implications of using WLANs. See section 4.2 for a comparison 
of the results of phase 2 of this study to the results of the 
SECURE Computing market research. 
2.3. Specific studies similar to the current study 
At this time, neither academic nor government studies similar to the 
current study are known; certainly no publications have been found. 
However, other studies related to WLAN security are currently being 
funded by the US Government's National Institute of Standards and 
Technology - Critical Infrastructure Grants Program -Computer Security 
Division. Research projects related to WLAN security are ~mder way at 
the University of Pittsburgh and the University of Maryland (Computer 
Security Grants Program, 2002). 
The University of Pittsburgh study is looking at developing "a survivable 
and secure wireless information architecture" while the University of 
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Maryland study is focusing on building "a secure wireless LAN/MAN 
infrastructure test bed" (ibid, 2002). 
2.4. Literature on the research methodology 
2.4.1. Inductive Research 
The methodology used in the study is based on an inductive 
research approach in which the researcher does not begin with a 
defined theory or hypothesis they wish to test. Instead, the 
researcher develops theories from the analysis of research data. 
This method may be used in new areas of research where 
hypotheses are yet to be established. The inductive method 
contrasts with the traditional scientific method that is based on a 
deductive approach. Both methods are shown in Figure 3 -The 
wheel of science (Babbie, 1992, p. 53). 
Empirical 
i5 (Geoer.>lisation.\ 
i= Observations Theories 
~ \ 
z ~Hypotheses'~~-
Figure 3 -The wheel of science 
f,1 
g 
g 
0 
z 
Babbie (1992, p.G4) defines induction as "The logical model in 
which general principles are developed from specific 
observations". 
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Trochim (2002) also describes the inductive process: 
"In inductive reasoning, we begin with specific 
observations and measures, begin to detect patterns 
and regularities, formulate some tentative 
hypotheses that we may explore, and finally end up 
developing some general conclusions or theories". 
This study uses the inductive approach to attempt to develop a 
theory or hypothesis regarding the usage of security tools in 
WLANs. 
2.4.2. Interview Surveys 
The data collected in phase 2 of the study was collected via an 
interview survey that was created for this research. See section 
3.2.2 for a discussion of criteria and limitations of the survey 
instrument. An interview survey was preferred for this study 
because ir.terview surveys generally achieve a much higher 
respor.Je rate than self-administered questionnaires. Babbie 
(1992, p.269) believes that interview surveys "ought to achieve a 
completion rate of at least 80 to 85 percent". 
Interviews were preferred as the researcher could be present to 
rephrase questions where necessary, or to follow up on any 
particular answer which needed to be explored further. Mitchell 
and Jolley (1988, p.289) describe this additional interaction with 
the respondent as "a tremendous asset in ... studies where you 
haven't yet identified all the important variables". 
One drawback of conducting interviews is that the research itself 
cannot be anonymous (Babbie, 1992, p. 467). However, it may 
be confidential in that the researcher promises that only the 
researcher will know the identity of the respondent or the 
respondent's organisation. It was important that this researcher 
made it clear to the responclents that the survey was conducted 
confidentially, not anonymously (ibid, 1992, p. 467). It was an 
imperative of this particular study that respondents understood 
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that their data would be kept confidential, as any identifying data 
might be used to attack a vulnerable WLAN. 
Respondents might have been reluctant to reveal infonnation 
about the configuration of their computer networks or may have 
chosen to give answers that did not correspond to the actual 
situation. Once assured that all information collected will be kept 
confidential, and that no identifying information will be 
published, the respondents may have been more comfortable in 
answering the questions honestly. In addition, because the survey 
was conducted in person, the respondents may have been more 
likely to give honest answers (Mitchell & Jolley, 1988, p. 289). 
Several authors discuss the problem of researcher bias when 
conducting interviews (Sproull, 1988, p. 166; Mitchell & Jolley, 
1988, p.289). As the researcher is present when the response is 
made, it may seem necessary to guide the respondent towards an 
answer. Any guidance may inadvertently be towards ideas that 
are preconceived by the researcher, not the respondent. 
This study is inductive and does not have ar.y specific theory or 
hypothesis to test; therefore, the incidence of preconceived ideas 
on the part of the researcher may be reduced. Close attention was 
paid by the researcher to avoid leading respondents. 
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3. Research Methodology 
The research was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 involved the scanning of 
certain areas of the Perth CBD in an attempt to detect WLANs that were 
operating. Phase 2 involved conducting survey interviews c,f IT Managers from 
organisations located in the Perth CBD to detennine the levels of implementation 
and usage of wireless networks. Each phase is discussed separately below. 
3.1. Phase 1 
3.1.1. Survey targets 
The survey targets for phase 1 of the study were the detectable 
WLANs operating in selected areas of the Perth CBD. Originally, 
it was planned to scan only a small section of Perth. However, 
after conducting preliminary scans, it was found that insufficient 
numbers ofWLANs were detected in the CBD. After conducting 
five preliminary scans, the greatest number of networks detected 
on any one scan was six, with an average of2.8. 
There may have been several factors contributing to the low 
number of WLANs detected. The equipment may not have been 
configured properly, the speed of the motor vehicle from which 
the scans were conducted may have been too high, and/or the 
structure of the buildings may have interfered with the signals. 
There may also have been other reasons which are not apparent to 
the author. As a result, it was decided that the scan area should be 
expanded to include some outlying regions such as East Perth and 
West Perth. 
A map of the final scan route maybe found in Appendix C. 
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3.1.2. Specific equipment used 
The laptop computer used for phase 1 (see Figure 4 below for 
image) is as follows: 
Manufacturer: ffiM ThinkPad 600E 
Processor: 366mhz Pentium II 
Memory: 96mb ofRAM 
Operating System: Dual Boot system running both Windows 98 
and Mandrake Linux v9.0 
Wireless NIC: Cabletron Orinoco RoamAbout 802.11 DS 
PC Card 
Sniffing software: Netstumbler v0.3.30 (in Windows 98), 
Kismet v. 2.6.0 (in Linux) 
Antenna: A directional antenna made from a tin can 
(see Figure 5 below for image). The 
specifications for the antenna are given 
below. 
Antenna Specifications 
Diameter: 85mm 
Length: l75mm 
Gain: 8-10 dbi 
For construction details refer to "How to build a waveguide 
antenna" at: www.tumpoint.net/wireless/cantennahowto.html 
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Figure 4- Laptop used for phase 1 scans 
Figure 5 -Antenna used for phase 1 scans 
3.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure for phase 1 of the study was as follows. 
The scanning method used to detect WLANs was essentially the 
same process used in war driving. The required hardware (see 
section 3.1.2) was initially used with Netstumbler software 
running under the Windows 98 operating system. Netstumbler 
software is capable of logging the MAC address, network name, 
Service Set Identifier (SSID), manufacturer, WEP state, and other 
data, such as signal strength, of detected WLAN access points. 
Netstumbler was chosen because it is capable of producing the 
data needed for the study and is freely available on th~ Internet. 
23 
... 
The first five preliminary scans failed to find more than six 
networks. After expanding the scau region, as described in 
section 3.1.1, problems detecting a sufficient number of networks 
were still experienced. 
The preliminary s-;ans were conducted using Netstumbler running 
in Windows 98. It became apparent, however, that the network 
card was causing some kind of hardware conflict when running 
under Windows and was not able to function correctly. Once it 
was clear that the scans could not be performed satisfactorily 
while running under Windows, a Linux~based tool had to be 
found. 
Kismet software is used to monitor and record wireless network 
traffic. It produces detailed network information similar to that 
produced by Netstumbler. Kismet uses a channel hopping 
function that means the user does not have to change channels 
manually while scanning. Kismet is also capable of revealing 
closed WLANs, which are networks that have masked their SSID. 
This gives Kismet an advantage over Netstumbler, which is only 
capable of detecting open networks. Kismet was chosen because 
it is capable of sniffing Access Points (APs) that have masked 
SSIDs and/or have switched off broadcast messages. As a result, 
the subsequent scans were performed while running Kismet under 
Linux. 
The five subsequent scans were much more successful than the 
preliminary scans performed while running Netstumbler under 
Windows and 170 networks were detected on the first day. See 
section 4.1 for complete scan results. 
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3.1.4. Data analysis 
The collected data was analysed and summarised using standard 
statistical methods. The results, in section 4.1 below, show: 
• The number of scans performed; 
• The results of each scan (see below) 
• The overall results (see below) 
Individual Scan Data Analysis 
For each of the five individual scans, the following statistics were 
generated: 
• The number of networks detected; 
• The count and percentage of each network type; 
• For infrastructure type networks :-
• The count and percentage with WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage without WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage with a masked SSID; 
• The count and percentage with a masked SSID and 
with WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage with a masked SSID and 
without WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage with the manufacturer's 
default SSID; 
• The count and percentage with the manufacturer's 
default SSID and with WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage with the manufacturer's 
default SSID without WEP enabled; 
• The count and percentage of the top 10 manufacturers 
of the wireless hardware that was detected (based on 
the MAC address). 
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These statistics were also produced for the cumulative set of 
unique networks that were detected over the five separate scans. 
Summary Data Analysis 
To summarise the distribution of each of the count statistics 
mentioned in the previous section, the following statistics were 
generated: 
• The count or frequency (n); 
• The minimum value; 
• The maximum value; 
• The centre shown by average and median; and 
• The spread shown by standard deviation and interquartile 
range. 
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3.2. Phase 2 
3.2.1. Survey targets 
The survey targets for phase 2 of the study were the IT directors 
or managers of selected Perth organisations. The candidate 
targets were chosen from a list of businesses operating in the 
Perth CBD. The names and addresses of the organisations were 
obtained from an electronic copy of the Telstra Whitepages™. 
This software allows the user to search for businesses by their 
street name. 
This search resulted in a sample frame of over 1500 businesses. 
This list was then shortened back to approximately 150 candidate 
organisations by a combined process of selection and elimination. 
Organisations were selected if their name was recognised by the 
researcher and they were deemed a good candidate for the 
research. That is, the researcher believed that the organisation 
was sufficiently large to have a computer network. 
Other organisations were eliminated because their name indicated 
that the business would be highly unlikely to have a wireless 
network or even a computer network. An example of the type of 
business that would have been immediately eliminated from the 
list is a business with the word "church" in its name. 
As the researcher only had a limited amount oftime and resources 
to contact. the potential interviewees, it was decided that 
approximately 150 candidate organisations would be sufficient to 
provide adequate data for the research, given the likelihood of a 
low participation rate. 
3.2.2. Equipment and ins~ruments 
The data collection instrument for phase 2 of the study was an 
interview survey during which each respondent was asked a set of 
prepared questions. See Appendix B for the survey instrument. 
This method was chosen ahead of a self-administered 
questionnaire, in an attempt to improve the response rate to the 
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survey and to pennit clarification of any responses (Sproull, 1988, 
p. 162). 
When designing the survey instrument, the researcher took care to 
avoid leading or biased questions that may have encouraged the 
respondents to answer questions in a particular way. The 
questions included in the instrument were developed to 
The design criteria for the survey instrument were driven by the 
research questions as outlined in section 1.4. The limitations of 
the instrument were imposed by the scope of the study in that 
only infonnation regarding 802.llb infrastructure WLANs was 
recorded. The number of questions was limited so that each 
interview would only take up between 10 and 20 minutes of each 
respor.dent's time. 
The equipment required for phase 2 was: 
• Telstra Whitepages™ on CD 
• ECU postage prepaid window faced envelopes 
• ECU letterhead 
• Access to a telephone 
3.2.3. Procedure 
Once the shortlist of potential interviewees had been finalised, a 
letter was sent to each organisation indicating that a research 
student from Edith Cowan University would be contacting them 
in the near future to discuss their organisation's participation in 
the research. The letter stressed the significance of the research to 
those organisations that chose to participate. See Appendix B for 
a copy of the letter. 
One week after the letters went out a phone call was made to each 
potential respondent. The purpose of the phone call was to 
identify the person within each organisation who would best be 
able to answer the interview questions. Once this person had 
been identified, the researcher attempted to arrange an 
appointment. 
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Of the 154 organisations contacted, many stated that either they 
outsourced their Infonnation Technology (IT) or that their IT was 
managed from some related office in the Eastern States. 
A summary of the results of the telephone calls to candidates is 
listed in Table l below. 
Result Quantity % 
Outsources IT 38 24.7 
Managed from Eastern States 26 16.9 
Didn't return messages 22 14.3 
Interviewed 20 13.0 
No answer I Wrong number 15 9.7 
Too busy 12 7.8 
Mail returned 11 7.1 
Not interested 7 4.5 
Policy not to do surveys 2 1.3 
No network I 0.6 
Total 154 100.0 
Table 1 -Results of telephone calls to candidates 
Originally, 15 organisations agreed to participate. This number 
later increased to 20 as several of the original interviewees 
recommended other candidates. This represents a 13 percent 
positive response. 
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3.2.4. Data analysis 
The collected data was analysed using both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Questions requiring a simple Yes I No answer and those that 
providtod an exhaustive list of possibilities were analysed using 
standard quantitative statistical methods such as count, 
percentage, average, etc. 
Qualitative Analysis 
Responses to open-ended questions that were designed to elicit 
new and anecdotal information from respondents were analysed 
qualitatively. This process (as summarised from Creswell, 1998, 
Ch. 8) involved: 
• Reviewing all collected information to obtain a sense of 
the overall data. 
• Writing notes and beginning to write swnmaries as an 
initial sorting out process. 
• Reducing data by developing codes or categories and then 
sorting data into those codes or categories. 
• The process then moved from reading data to describing, 
classifying and interpreting data. 
• Classifying data involved taking text apart, looking for 
patterns, categories, or themes of information. 
• The result of this process was narrative text supplemented 
by tables and figures reflecting the r.lassification of the 
data. 
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4. Results aud Findings 
Each phase of the research is discussed separately below. 
4.1. Pha.e I results 
The route taken during the five scans included in the results may be seen in 
Appendix C. The route was the same on each occasion, though the time of 
day of each scan varied. The scans were performed on five consecutive 
business days starting on Tuesday January 14, 2003 and concluding on 
Monday January 20, 2003. 
The software used in the five scans produced a set of comma delimited 
text files that were then imported into a spreadsheet program for analysis. 
The data that each of the Kismet files contained is as follows: 
• A network number which is a unique number indicating the order 
that the networks were detected in; 
• The type of network traffic given by one of five or six types. These 
types are ad hoc, data, infrastructure, lucent, probe and unknown Ad 
hoc indicates that the network traffic detected belonged to a WLAN 
that did not utilise an access point. Data indicates that the network is 
a data~only network with no control packets. Infrastructure indicates 
that the network traffic is coming from an access point. Lucent 
indicates that the network traffic is coming from an outdoor router. 
Probe indicates that a client was attempting to gain access to a 
WLAN but the scanning device was out of range once the access was 
achieved. Had the scanning device still be in range, the probe request 
would have changr:d to either an ad hoc or infrastructure network 
type; 
., The Extended Service Set Identifier (ESSID) which is the name of 
theWLAN; 
• The Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID) which contains the Media 
Access Control (MAC) address of the access point; 
• Info which only has a value when the manufacturer is Cisco/ Aironet; 
• Channel - One of II channels in which WLAN devices operate, 
where each channel operates in a slightly different frequency; 
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• Maxrate- the maximum data rate of the device; 
• WEP - a Yes/No field which states whether WEP encryption is 
enabled on the device; 
• LLC, Data, Crypt, Weak and Total which are fields that describe 
the types of packets detected; 
• First which is a time stamp that indicates when the network device 
was first detected; 
• Last whicl. is a time stamp that indicates when the network device 
was last detected; 
• Best Signal which indicates the best signal strength achieved for the 
detected device; and 
• Best Noise that indicates the highest noise level achieved for the 
detected device. 
From the imported data, it was then possible to generate two more fields of 
information. From the MAC address contained in the BSSID, it was 
possible to determine the manufacturer of the device, as the first 24 bits 
of a MAC address uniquely identify the manufacturer of the device. This 
information was obtained from a list of registered MAC addresses 
avai table at http: //standards. i ece.orglregauth/oui/index .sh tml 
By obtaining a list of default SSIDs (SSID Defaults, 2003), it was 
possible to detennine if the ESSID detected was still set .to the 
manufacturer's default value. This is important as it may indicate an out-
of-the-box installation, especially if the access point is using the default 
SSID ar j has WEP switched off. 
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4.1.1. Preliminary scans 
As a result of the problems encountered while conducting the 
preliminary scans (see section 3.1.3), the preliminary scan data 
has not been analysed. 
The following sections provide the results of scans that were 
conducted after the operating system and scanning software were 
changed to Linux and Kismet respectively. For each of the five 
scans conducted, a set of results, presented as tables, is given. 
The results for scan 1 include a discussion on what information is 
being presented. For each subsequent scan, the table structures 
and format are the same. See section 4.1.8 for a summmy of the 
five scans and a discussion of the results therein. 
4.1.2. Scan 1 results 
Scan Date: Tuesday January 14, 2003 
Start Time: 1:25pm 
Finish Time: 2:25pm 
Total Networks Detected: 171 
Table 2 shows how these networks were separated by their 
network type. Section 4.1 contains a description of each network 
type. 
Network by Network Type Count % 
Ad-hoc 11 6 
Data 5 3 
Infrastructure 136 80 
Lucent 2 1 
Probe 17 10 
Total 171 100 
Table 2 -Networks by network type (scan 1) 
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Table 3 analyses only the infrastructure networks. 
Infrastructure Networks Count % 
With WEP enabled 88 65 
v-; ;thout WEP enabled 48 35 
With masked SSID 58 43 
With masked SSID and with 51 38 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 7 5 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 20 15 
With default SSID and with I I WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 19 14 WEP enabled 
Table 3- Infrastructure only networks (scan 1) 
An indicator that a WLAN has been securely configured, at least 
in part, is if it has masked its SSID and enabled WEP. 38 percent 
of the infrastructure networks detected had at least this level of 
security. Masking of the SSID is one way that WLANs may hide 
their presence from casual hackers. Five percent of the 
infrastructure networks detected had a masked SSID but had not 
enabled WEP. These networks may still have been securely 
configured as they may have employed third party encryption 
tools, which would not have shown up in the scan data 
Another indicator of the level of security of a WLAN is whether 
the network administrator has changed the SSID from the default 
given by the manufacturer. If the default SSID is still in place, 
and WEP has not been enabled, then an out-of-the-box 
installation is indicated. Of the infrastructure networks detected, 
14 percent showed this lack of even the most basic awareness of 
security measures. 
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Table 4 below shows the breakdown of the networks by 
manufacturer. This was detennined by the manufacturer that 
registered the MAC found in the BSSID. 
MAC Registered to Count % 
Aironet Wireless Communications 45 26 
Agere Systems 28 16 
Apple Computer Inc 15 9 
Enterasys 13 8 
Cabletron 12 7 
Lucent Technologies 11 6 
Symbol Technologies 11 6 
ANI Communications 8 5 
Delta Networks 7 4 
All Others 21 12 
Total 171 100 
Table 4 M Networks by manufacturer (scan 1) 
Results for each subsequent scan are given below. The same 
fonnat has been utilised ... 
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4.1.3. Scan 2 results 
Scan Date: Wednesday January 15,2003 
Start Time: 9:45 am 
Finish Time: 11:10 am 
Total Networks Detected: 165 
Network by Network Type Count % 
Ad-hoc 9 5 
Data 4 2 
Infrastructure 134 81 
Lucent 2 I 
Probe 16 10 
Total 165 100 
Table 5 -Networks by network type (scan 2) 
Infrastructure Networks Count % 
With WEP enabled 83 62 
Without WEP enabled 51 38 
With masked SSID 54 40' 
With masked SSID and with 44 33 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 10 7 
without WEP enabled 
With default SS!D 21 16 
With default SS!D and with 0 0 WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 21 16 WEP enabled 
Table 6- Infrastructure only networks (scan 2) 
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MAC Registered to Count % 
Aironet Wireless Communications 47 28 
Agere Systems 28 17 
Enterasys 11 7 
Symbol Technologies 11 7 
Cabletron 10 6 
Lucent Technologies 10 6 
Apple Computer Inc 9 5 
ANI Communications 8 5 
Premax Electronics 6 4 
Others 25 IS 
Total 165 100 
Table 7- Networks by manufacturer (scan 2) 
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4.1.4. Scan 3 results 
Scan Date: Thursday January 16,2003 
Start Time: 10:40 am 
Finish Time: 12:10 pm 
Total Networks Detected: 179 
Network by Network Type Count % 
Ad-hoc 18 10 
Data 6 3 
Infrastructure 134 75 
Lucent 2 I 
Probe 19 11 
Total 179 100 
Table 8 -Networks by network type (scan 3) 
JTJfrastructure Networks Count % 
With WEP enabled 85 63 
Without WEP enabled 49 37 
With masked SSID 45 34 
With masked SSID and with 40 30 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID aud 5 4 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 20 15 
With default SSID and with 0 0 WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 20 15 WEP enabled 
Table 9- Infrastructure only networks (scan 3) 
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MAC Registered to Count % 
Aironet Wireless Communications 47 26 
Agere Systems 32 18 
. 
Enterasys IS 8 
Apple Computer Inc 14 8 
Cabletron 12 7 
Lucent Technologies II 6 
Symbol Technologies II 6 
ANI Communications 8 4 
Delta Networks 5 3 
Others 24 13 
Total 179 100 
Table 10- Networks by manufacturer (scan 3) 
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4.1.5. Scan 4 results 
Scan Date: Friday January 17,2003 
Start Time: 11 :40 am 
Finish Time: 1:15 pm 
Total Networks Detected: 173 
Network by Network Type Count 
Ad-hoc 14 
Data 5 
Infrastructure 133 
Lucent 3 
Probe 16 
Unknown 2 
Total 173 
Table 11-Networks by network type (scan 4) 
Infrastructure Networks Count 
With WEP enabled 83 
Without WEP enabled 50 
With masked SSID 48 
With masked SSID and with 42 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 6 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 19 
With default SSID and with 0 WEP enabled 
With default S~ID and without 19 WEP enabled 
Table 12- Infrastructure only networks (scan 4) 
40 
% 
8 
3 
77 
2 
9 
I 
100 
% 
62 
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36 
32 
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14 
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MAC Registered to Count % 
Aironet Wireless Communications 45 26 
Agere Systems 33 19 
Enterasys 16 9 
Apple Computer Inc 13 8 
Lucent Technologies 13 8 
Cabletron 12 7 
Symbol Teclmologies 12 7 
ANI Communications 7 4 
Delta Networks 5 3 
Others 17 10 
Total 173 100 
Table 13 - Networks by manufacturer (scan 4) 
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4.1.6. Scan 5 results 
Scan Date: Monday January 20, 2003 
Start Time: 10:55 am 
Finish Time: 12:10 pm 
Total Networks Detected: 173 
Network by Network Type Count % 
Ad-hoc 8 5 
Data 4 2 
Infrastructure 137 79 
Lucent 2 1 
Probe 22 13 
Total 173 100 
Table 14 -Networks by network type (scan 5) 
Infrastructure Networks Count % 
With WEP enabled 84 61 
Without WEP enabled 53 39 
With masked SSID 47 34 
With masked SSID and with 42 31 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 5 4 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 20 15 
With default SSID and with 1 1 WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 19 14 WEP enabled 
Table 15- Infrastructure only networks (scan 5) 
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MAC Registered to Count % 
Aironet Wireless Communications 48 28 
Agere Systems 30 17 
Apple Computer Inc 14 8 
Enterasys 13 8 
Symbol Technologies 13 8 
Lucent Technologies 12 7 
Cabletron 9 s 
ANI Communications 8 s 
Delta Networks s 3 
Others 21 12 
Total 173 100 
Table 16- Networks by manufacturer (sc:m 5) 
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4.1.7. Unique networks detected 
By importing the results of all scans into a single spreadsheet and 
then filtering out the duplicate BSSIDs, it was possible to 
generate a list of unique networks detected over the five days. 
Total Networks Detected: 260 
Network by Network Type Count % 
Ad-hoc 27 10 
Data 7 3 
Infrastructure 177 68 
Lucent 2 1 
Probe 45 17 
Unknown 2 1 
Total 260 100 
Table 17 -Networks by network type (unique networks) 
These results show that there was a larger proportion of probe 
requests than normal, 17 percent compared to an average of 10 
percent. This is because probe requests are attempts by client 
devices to attach to a WLAN. Once the attachment has been 
made, the client device would not appear in the scan results, 
rather, the access point that the client had attached to would show 
up in the infrastructure results. Probe requests would likely come 
from a multitude of clients over the five days of the scans whereas 
access points' showing as infrastructure network types would be 
more static. 
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Figure 6 -Networks by network type (unique networks) 
Infrastructure Networks Count o;o 
With WEP enabled 106 60 
Without WEP enabled 71 40 
With masked SSID 73 41 
With masked SSID and with 59 33 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 14 8 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 26 15 
With default SSID and with 1 1 WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 25 14 WEP enabled 
Table 18- Infrastructure only networks (unique networks) 
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Figure 9 - Infrastructure networks with or without a default 
SSID, and with or without WEP enabled 
MAC Registered to Count o;o 
Aironet Wireless Communications 55 21 
Agere Systems 51 20 
Enterasys 23 9 
Apple Computer Inc 21 8 
Cabletron 17 7 
Symbol Technologies 17 7 
Lucent Technologies 14 5 
ANI Communications 10 4 
Delta Networks 8 3 
Others 44 17 
Total 260 100 
Table 19- Networks by manufacturer (unique networks) 
The list of unique infrastructure networks was then sorted and 
filtered to determine how the security statistics were distributed 
-·by manufacturer. 
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Table 20 shows the breakdown by manufacturer of infrastructure 
networks, with and without WEP enabled. 
The manufacturers have been sorted by the percentage with WEP 
enabled. 
WEP 
MAC Registered to , Yes % No % 
Enterasys 9 9 100 0 0 
Cabletron 11 10 91 1 9 
Agerc Systems 22 18 82 4 18 
Aironet Wireless 54 33 61 21 39 Communications 
ANI Communications 10 6 60 4 40 
Apple Computer Inc 12 6 50 6 50 
Symbol Technologies 17 8 47 9 53 
Lucent Technologies 7 2 29 5 71 
Delta Networks 8 2 25 6 75 
Others 27 12 44 15 56 
Total 177 106 60 71 40 
Table 20 -Infrastructure networks with or without WEP, by 
manufacturer 
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Table 21 shows the breakdown by manufacturer of networks that 
have masked their SSID and enabled WEP. 
The manufacturers have been arranged from the most secure to 
the least secure. 
With masked SSID and WEP 
MAC Registered to n Count % 
Enterasys 9 9 100 
Cabletron 11 9 82 
Agere Systems 22 14 64 
Symbol Technologies 17 8 47 
Aironet Wireless 
Communications 54 14 26 
Apple Computer Inc 12 2 17 
Lucent Technologies 7 1 14 
Others 27 2 7 
ANI Communications 10 0 0 
Delta Networks 8 0 0 
Total 177 59 33 
' 
Table 21 - Infrastructure networks with masked SSID and 
witb WEP enabled, by manufacturer 
49 
Table 22 shows the breakdown by manufacturer of networks that 
are using the default SSID and have not enabled WEP, indicating 
and out~of~the~box installation. 
The manufacturers have been arranged from the most secure to 
the least secure. 
MAC Registered to II Count % 
Agere Systems 22 0 0 
Apple Computer Inc 12 0 0 
Cabletron II 0 0 
Enterasys 9 0 0 
ANI Communications 10 I 10 
Others 27 4 15 
Aironet Wireless 
Communications 54 II 20 
Symbol Technologies 17 4 24 
Lucent Technologies 7 2 29 
Delta Networks 8 4 50 
Total 177 26 15 
Table 22 - Infrastructure networks with default SSID and 
without WEP enabled, by manufacturer 
Enterasys equipment was the most secure, with 100 percent 
configured with a masked SSID and WEP enabled. Cabletron 
was next with 9 out of 11 configured as per the Enterasys 
equipment. No Enterasys or Cabletron networks detected 
indicated that they had been set up out-of~the~box. 
Aironet Wireless Communications, which is part of Cisco, had 
the greatest share of detected network devices but nearly 40 
percent had not enabled WEP, and 20 percent suggested a default 
configuration. Delta Networks fared the worst with 75 percent 
unprotected by WEP, and 50% with a default configuration. 
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4.1.8. Scans snmmary 
The data from the five scans has been summarised using basic 
statistical methods that generate counts, averages, minima, and 
maxima plus measures of centre and spread. Please note that in 
each case the summary statistics show that the minimum and 
maximum values are within the tolerance allowed for outliers 
(less than 1.5(IQR) above IQ3 and below IQl) therefore all 
results are included in the summary statistics. 
The total number of networks detected during each of the five 
scans is shown numerically in Table 23 and then graphically in 
Figure 10. These counts are then further analysed statistically in 
Table 24. 
Total Networks Detected 
Scan 1 Scan 2 Scan 3 Scan4 Scan 5 
171 165 179 173 173 
Table 23 - Total networks detected 
Scan 1 Scan 2 Scan 3 Scan 4 Scan 5 
Fignre 10- Total networks detected 
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Statistical Function Result 
Minimum 165 
IQ 1 - lower quartile 168 
Median 173 
IQ3 - upper quartile 176 
Maximum 179 
IQR- inter-quartile range 8 
Average 172.2 
Standard deviation 5.01996 
Table 24 - Summary of total networks detected 
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Figure 11 - Box plot of networks detected 
52 
A summary of the number of infrastructure networks detected 
across the five scans is given in the following tables and figures. 
Infrastructure Networks Detected 
Scan 1 Scan2 Scan3 Scau4 Scan 5 
136 134 134 133 137 
Table 25 - Infrastructure networks detected 
Figure 12 - Infrastructure networks detected 
Statistical Function Result 
Minimum 133 
IQ1 -lower quartile 133.5 
Median 134 
IQ3 - upper quartile 136.5 
Maximum 137 
IQR- inter-quartile range 3 
Average 134.8 
Standard deviation 1.64317 
Table 26- Summary of infrastructure networks detected 
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Figure 13 -Box plot of infrastructure networks detected 
The results for the infrastructure networks shown are fairly 
consistent across the five scans. At first it might seem that the 
same set of networks were being picked up each time, however, 
the results of the unique networks detected show that there were 
in fact 177 unique infrastructure networks detected. This 
indicates that the relatively consistent number of infrastructure 
networks detected on each scan is a coincidence. 
For each scan, the networks detected were categorised by network 
type. The average number of networks detected across the five 
scans (as seen in Table 24) was 172.2. The averages by network 
type are given in Table 27 below. 
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Network by Network Type Average 
Ad-hoc 12 
Data 4.8 
Infrastructure 134.8 
Lucent 2.2 
Probe 18 
Other 0.4 
Total 172.2 
Table 27 -Networks by network type (summary) 
data, 3% 
ad-hoc, 7% ------
unknown, 0% 
probe, 1 
0/o 
7 
3 
78 
1 
10 
0 
100 
78% 
Figure 14- Networks by network type (summary) 
Summarising just the infrastructure networks, the following 
average counts and percentages (of the average infrastructure 
count of 134.8) were determined. 
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Infrastructure Networks Average % 
With WEP enabled 84.6 63 
Without WEP enabled 50.2 37 
With masked SSID 50.4 37 
With masked SSID and with 43.8 32 WEP enabled 
With masked SSID and 6.6 5 
without WEP enabled 
With default SSID 20 15 
With default SSID and with 0.4 0 WEP enabled 
With default SSID and without 19.6 15 WEP enabled 
Table 28- Infrastructure only networks (summary) 
WithoutWEP 
enabled 
enabled 
63% 
Figure 15 - Infrastructure networks with or without WEP 
enabled (summary) 
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SSID and with WEP enabled (summary) 
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Figure 17 - Infrastructure networks with or without default 
SSID and with or without WEP (summary) 
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4.1.9. Comparison of results to other research 
The results of phase 1 may be compared to the results of the two 
worldwide war drives (WWWDs) that took place in early 
September and late October 2002. WWWD 1 and WWWD2 were 
organised and coordinated by a group of amateur wireless sniffers 
from across the globe, though most of the scans were conducted 
in North America. 
The statistical results (taken from Worldwide War Drive Results, 
2002) are shown in Table 29 and Table 30 below. 
Category Total % 
Total APs found 9374 100 
WEP enabled 2825 30.14 
No WEP enabled 6549 69.86 
Default SSID 2768 29.53 
Default SSID and no WEP enabled 2497 26.64 
I--
Unique SSIDs 3672 39.17 
Most common SSID 1778 18.97 
2nd most common SSID 623 6.65 
Table 29 - Results of WWWDl 
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Category Total % % 
change 
Total APs found 24958 100 N/A 
WEP e11.abled 6970 27.93 -2.21 
No WEP enabled 17988 72.07 2.21 
Default SSID 8802 35.27 5.74 
Default SSID and no WEP 
enabled 7847 31.44 4.80 
Most common SSID 5310 21.28 2.31 
2nd most common SSID 2048 8.21 1.56 
Table 30- Results ofWWWD2 
When combined, these scans found that on average only 29 
percent of detected APs had WEP enabled. This is significantly 
less than the 63 percent average of infrastructure networks with 
WEP enabled uncovered during phase 1 of this study. There are 
several possible reasons for this large discrepancy. 
Firstly, the more recent of the two WWWDs was done more than 
three months prior to the scans for this study and it is possible that 
user awareness has increased dramatically during that time. 
resulting in an increase in applied security. 
Secondly, the scan regions were significantly different. The 
participants in both WWWDs stated that "home installations 
accounted for the majority of the APs detected" (Brewin, 2002). 
This was inferred from the types of APs detected. This is 
significant because home users may be more likely to leave 
security switched off or be unaware of the need for security. 
Chiswell is quoted by Douglas (2002) as saying, "Home users 
often leave themselves vulnerable to an attack through a lack of 
awareness". 
Thirdly, the scanning software used by the WWWD participants 
was Netstumbler. Netstumbler is not capable of detecting APs 
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who have masked their SSIDs. For this reason, the WWWD 
scans would not have detected any networks whose administrators 
would be most likely to have enabled WEP, as masking the SSID 
of the network is a fundamental step in securing a WLAN. This 
statement is backed up by the results of phase 1 as they show that 
88 percent of the networks that had a masked SSID also had WEP 
enabled. 
To test this theory, the results from phase 1 were reproduced, 
omitting the data for the infrastructure networks that have masked 
SSIDs. The list of unique infrastructure networks was filtered to 
show only infrastructure networks that had not masked the SSID. 
There were 177 unique infrastructure networks detected, of which 
73 had masked the SSID. This left 104 infrastructure networks 
without a masked SSID. Of these 104, 47 or 45 percent had 
enabled WEP, while 57 or 55 percent had not. 
Figure 18 shows how the results from the WWWDs compare to 
the results from phase 1 of this study, in regards to whether WEP 
was enabled. 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
WWWDs All No 
Networks Masked 
SSID 
Masked 
SSID 
Figure 18- Comparison of scan results showing WEP enabled 
Two other comparisons may be made between the WWWDs and 
phase 1 of this study. The number of APs using the default SSID 
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and the number of APs with the default SSID and without WEP 
were measured in both studies. 
On average, 34 percent of the APs detected during the WWWDs 
were using the default SSID. This compares to 15 percent found 
during phase I of this study. Once again, this discrepancy is most 
likely caused by the difference in the types of networks detected, 
i.e. home networks compared to business networks. 
A closer fit was found in the comparison of networks that were 
using the default SSID and had not enabled WEP. On average, 
the WWWDs found that 89 percent of the networks with a default 
SSID had not enabled WEP, while the results from this stndy 
showed that of the networks that used a default SSID, 96 percent 
had not enabled WEP. 
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4.2. Phase 2 results 
Of the 154 organisations contacted, 20 agreed to participate with this 
study. The respondents from these 20 organisations classified their 
organisations as shown in Table 31 below. The median number of 
network nodes represents the most· often selected option for that 
classification. A summary of the number of network nodes per 
organisation may be seen in Figure 19 below. 
Organisation Type Count % Median# Network Nodes 
Agricultural services I 5 100+ 
Consulting - IT 1 5 51-100 
Consulting - Security 1 5 <10 
Finance 4 20 26-50 
Government 6 30 100+ 
Hotel 1 5 26-50 
Law 1 5 51-100 
Member organisation 2 10 51-100 
Mining & exploration 3 15 100+ 
Total 20 100 100+ 
Table 31 -Respondent organisation classification 
<10 11-25 26-50 51-100 100+ 
Number of Network Nodes 
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Figure 19- Overall number of network nodC!i 
The data collected during the interview surveys falls into the two 
categories of quantitative data and qualitative data. The quantitative data 
represents answers to Yes/No and exhaustive list questions. See questions 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 14 in the interview survey 
instrument of Appendix B. The qualitative data represents answ~rs to 
open-ended questions. See questions 2, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12 of the interview 
survey instrument, as well as additional anecdotal infonnation collected. 
Some questions, e.g. 2, 6, 7 and 9, have both quantitative and qualitative 
components to the answers. 
4.2.1. Question 1 results 
The first ~uestion in the survey asked the respondents if their 
organisations had tested and/01 ;mplemented any 802.llb WLAN 
technology. Table 32 shows the responses to this question. 
Response Count % 
Yes 6 30 
No 14 70 
Total 20 100 
Table 32 ~ Do you have a WLAN? 
This result closely matches that of the SECURE Computing 
magazine research (see section 2.2.2 for details) conducted in the 
UK in which 31 percent of respondents had a wireless LAN. 
Those organisations who answered Yes to question one were then 
asked questions 2 through to 7. Questions 8 through to 12 were 
answered by respondents who answered No to question one. 
Of the 30 percent of organisations who have tested and/or 
implemented an 802.11 b WLAN, half were government 
organisations, with the other half being made up of mining and 
exploration, member organisations, and consulting (see Figure 
20). 
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Figure 20- Organisations with WLANs 
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Two thirds of the organisations who have WLANs have more 
than 100 network nodes (see Figure 21 ). 
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Figure 21 -Number of nodes for organisations with WLANs 
4.2.2. Question 2 results 
When asked if they were aware of any security implications of 
using WLANs, 100 percent of the organisations that have wireless 
networks responded in the affirmative. When prompted to 
expand on their answers, the following data emerged. 
WEP weaknesses 
Many of the comments made in response to question two were 
related to WEP, the encryption built in to the 802.11b standard. 
The types of comments made range from a general knowledge of 
the weaknesses ofWEP, for example "I guess WEP is not deemed 
to be totally secure, it can be cracked" (Respondent 5), to the 
more specific mention of the problems associated w:~n weak key 
reuse. 
"The biggest issue is the encryption algoritlun that's used- RC4 
to do with the production of weak keys, with sufficient weak keys 
being grabbed, the user may use software like AirSnort and things 
like that to be able to unencrypt [sic1 the packets" (Respondent 
19). 
Two of the interviewees mentioned that the problems with WEP 
cannot be fixed by increasing the length of the key. "128 bit is 
nearly as vulnerable as 40 bit" (Respondent 5). "Regardless of 
the levels of encryption that you have, if you have the ability to 
sniff data and get sufficient data then you can crack the network'' 
(Respondent 15) 
These respondents demonstrated a reasonable knowledge of the 
problems with WEP key lengths. As Walker (2000) stated, the 
WEP encapsulation remains insecure whether its key length is 1 
bit or 1000 bits. 
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Physical Access 
Four of the six intetviewees spoke of their awareness that hackers 
do not need to have physical access to the network infrastructure 
to be able to intercept transmissions. "People don't have to be 
plugged into something physical in order to access your network" 
(Respondent 2). 
The practice of war driving was also mentioned, though not by 
name. "People can just sort of sit outside the office in a car and 
log into your network" (Respondent 5). 
These comments show that many of the respondents are aware of 
the inability of WLAN administrators to control unauthorised 
access to the transmission medium. 
General Comments 
One respondent talked about how his organisation had gone ahead 
with the implementation of a WLAN even though he "doesn't 
believe that there is such a thing as a secure wireless network". 
The respondent felt that there would always be risks in operating 
a wireless network but it was a "case of convenience versus the 
risk" (Respondent 15). This indicates that the respondent believes 
the benefits of wireless outweigh the risks. 
Another respondent's organisation had yet to move from testing 
into production with his or her WLAN. This person stated that 
the organisation would not "let it out" until they had done a lot 
more research and come up with an organisation-wide standard 
for implementing WLANs. The respondent mentioned that this 
would probably take another 12 months and would most likely 
correspond with a shift in premises {Respondent 5). 
A third respondent, whose organisation only uses WLANs for 
special events and not as part of their regular network, declared "I 
don't think it's yet acceptable for a corporate environment that 
involves sensitive data" (Respondent 2). 
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This statement is an indication of the reluctance of organisations 
to trust their sensitive data to what is perceived to be an open 
medium. 
Question 2 Summary 
In summary, the respondents to question two showed a good 
understanding of the security problems associated with WLAN 
technology. 
This knowledge is reassuring as all of those who responded to this 
question have implemented or tested 802.llb WLANs. 
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4.2.3. Question 3 results 
The third question asked the respondents how they were made 
aware of the security implications. They were given a list of 
seven possible information sources, from which they could select 
as many as were applicable. 
There were six respondents who have WLANs and therefore 
responded to this question. The statistics for the number of 
infonnation sources are shown in Table 33 below. These results 
show that one interviewee (Respondent 6) had only one source of 
infonnation, while another interviewee (Respondent 5) had six 
sources. On average, the interviewees had at least three sources 
of information regarding the security ofWLANs. 
Statistical Type Count 
Average 3.5 
Minimum I 
Maximum 6 
Median 4 
Table 33 ~Information source statistics 
Of the seven sources of infonnation listed, the most common 
sources used were mailing lists, security based internet sites, and 
colleagues (66.7 percent each). Only 50 percent of respondents 
had received information regarding WLAN security from their 
hardware vendors. For a complete breakdown of the results of 
question 3, see Table 34 below. 
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Information Source Count % 
Mailing list 4 66.7 
Security Internet site 4 66.7 
Colleague(s) 4 66.7 
WLAN hardware vendor 3 50.0 
Print media 3 50.0 
Other, general Internet site 2 33.3 
Other* I 16.7 
Table 34 - Sources of information regarding WLAN security 
*The oLlter source in this case was security seminars. 
These results are compared to and combined with the results of 
Question 10 in section 4.2.14. 
4.2.4. Question 4 results 
The fourth question asked the respondents if they had enabled the 
built-in WEP encryption. Five out of six respondents stated that 
they had enabled WEP. 
4.2.5. Question S results 
The fifth question asked the respondents if they were aware of 
any design flaws that allow hackers to decipher WEP-encrypted 
data. The results were identical to the results of question 4, that 
is, five out of six organisations responded in the affinnative. This 
shows that 100 percent of the organisations that had employed 
WEP were aware of its limitations. 
4.2.6. Question 6 results 
The organisations with WLANs were then asked if they had 
employed any other enc.:ryption tools. Only one interviewee 
(Respondent 15) said Yes. This organisation had implemented a 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) over the top ofWEP. 
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4.2.7. Question 7 results 
Question 7 asked the interviewees if their organisations had 
employed any security tools other than encryption. Four or 67 
percent said Yes. 
The tools employed were as shown below in Table 35: ~ 
Security Tool Count % 
Access controls 2 50 
Authentication 2 50 
Weak key avoidance I 25 
Table 35- Additional security tools employed 
One of the interviewees (Respondent 5) who responded No to 
question 7 stated that the reason they had not added any further 
security to their WLAN was because they had never moved their 
network out of testing mode. 
When the testing was conducted, between December 2000 and 
May 2001, the organisation was not aware of the security 
problems affecting WLA.~s. The respondent added that if they 
were implementing a WLAN now, they would "at least use 
[Access Control Lists] ACLs". 
If the respondent was referring to Ethernet MAC ACLs then the 
network might still be at risk because MAC addresses may be 
spoofed, however he may have been referring to third party 
ACI.s. 
Questions 8 through to 12 were answered by the respondents who 
have not implemented or tested WLANs. 
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4.2.8. Question 8 results 
Question 8 asked the interviewees if their organisation intended to 
test and/or implement any 802.11 b WLAN technology in the next 
12 months. 
Of the 14 respondents who had ·not already tested or implemented 
a WLAN, 3 or 21 percent said that they would, while 11 or 79 
percent said they would not. 
Of the eleven respondents that replied No to question 8, four were 
from finance organisations and three were from government. 
Mining& 
9% 
Hotel 
9% 
Government 
27% 
Figure 22 - Organisations that do not intend to implement or 
test WLAN technology, by organisation type 
It is significant that none of the respondents from finance 
organisations have already implemented or tested WLAN 
technology, nor do they intend to in the near future. This shows 
that the finance industry may have an unwillingness to use 
technology that is described by many as immature and unsafe, 
regardless of the perceived benefits. 
4.2.9. Question 9 results 
When asked if they were "aware of any security implications of 
using WLANs", ten or 71 percent of the 14 organisations without 
WLANs said Yes and four or 29 percent said No. When 
prompted to expand on their answers, the following Jata emerged. 
Wardriving 
Of the ten organisations that answered Yes to this question, eight 
or 80 percent were aware of the practice of war driving, though, 
as for question 2, none of them mentioned it by name. 
One respondent (number 18) talked about a seminar he had 
attended which was held by one of his organisation's outsource 
suppliers. At the seminar, the supplier conducted a war driving 
demonstration in Perth to show the attendants how easy it was to 
detect and in some cases, attach to insecure networks. "It was 
actually quite enlightening to see that he, using this fairly basic 
type of technology that he could buy down at a Dick Smith type 
of shop for a few hundred dollars, and drive around in a car 
saying 'there's a point ... there's a point. .. there's a point. .. ' ... in 
some cases [he] was able to connect to that network.". 
Thi:> seminar, where the presenter demonstrated the 
vulnerabilities of real networks, appears to have made a 
significant impact on the respondent, more so perhaps than if the 
content of the seminar had been purely theoretical. 
Another respondent was aware that some war drivers publish their 
findings on the Internet for others to use. " ... in a number of 
places including Perth you have places where people have 
identified where locations of networks with weak points are" 
(Respondent 16). 
This respondent is probably referring to websites known as web 
logs or 'blogs'. These sites are community~based websites that 
often post maps showing the locations of open wireless networks. 
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WEP weaknesses 
Half of the respondents mentioned problems with the encryption 
used in 802.11 b WLANs. The comments though, were all 
general in nature, for example, "from a high level perspective I'm 
aware that there are WEP based problems" (Respondent 20). 
When comparing these responses to those in section 4.2.2, it is 
evident that the organisations that have WLANs have a higher 
awareness of specific WEP problems than those organisations that 
do not have WLANs. 
Poor configuration 
Two of the respondents made comments regarding the security 
issues arising from a poorly configured WLAN. One of these 
comments came from respondent 20. "I know that [the problems} 
are overcome by nailing it [the WLANJ down properly, it's 
usually just poor implementations that enable people to access 
[the networks}". 
Though poor implementations are definitely a security hazard, 
some issues such as the problems with WEP are not 
implementation dependent. These issues currently require third 
party solutions; they cannot be fixed by "nailing it down". 
Immature technology 
Respondents 13 and 16 both stated that they felt that wireless 
LAN technology is 'bleeding edge' technology that is still 
immature, especially concerning security. "This clearly indicates 
to us that the technology itself is not at a mature level yet ... we 
do not consider the security of the solution mature enough" 
(Respondent 16). 
73 
General comments 
The open or public nature of radio frequency transmissions was 
mentioned by three of the interviewees (Respondents 3, 11, 17). 
One manager talked about the difference in priorities between 
vendors and consumers. "There is a big sales push for it and 
usually they tell you how great it is and you find out how bad it is 
after when it could be too late" (Respondent 13). 
One respondent from a large mining and exploration company 
mentioned how the parent body of his organisation had 
implemented organisation-wide WLAN security standards. This 
particular organisation had not yet implemented a WLAN but 
planned to do so within 12 months. Another company that came 
under the same parent body had already put a WLAN in place. 
"Our security group in [the parent organisation] said 'right- no 
more wireless LANs until we've actually sorted out what the 
security issues are. We are going to set up the standards so that 
when you [eventually] do it, you know exactly what you've got to 
do to minimise or eliminate the risk" (Respondent 18). 
In March 2002, once these standards were in place, the security 
group conducted audits on any existing WLANs within the group 
of companies to ensure that they were compliant. The security 
group told the IT managers "if you are not up to scratch in tenns 
of your security, we're discotmecting you from the rest of the 
[organisation] network". 
This stance from the organisation's internal security group 
indicates how seriously they view unsafe WLANs. They are not 
prepared to jeopardise the security of the network because 
someone within the group has set up an insecure WLAN, which 
could potentially open up the entire network to intruders. 
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Question 9 Summary 
In summary, the respondents to question nine showed a 
reasonable understanding of the security problems associated with 
WLAN technology. 
When compared to the results of question two, the respondents to 
this question had a more general, high-level understanding of the 
issues than those respondents who have implemented WLAN 
technology. 
For the combined results of question 2 and question 9 sec section 
4.2.14. 
4.2.10. Question 10 results 
The tenth question asked the respondents how they were made 
aware of the security implications. They were given a list of 
seven possible information sources, from which they could select 
as many as were applicable. 
There were 10 respondents who do not have WLANs but are 
aware of wireless security issues, and therefore responded to this 
question. The statistics for the number of information sources are 
shown in Table 36 below. These results show that one 
in\::rvicwee (Respondent 6) had only one source of information, 
while another interviewee (Respondent 5) had six sources. On 
average, the interviewees had at least three sources of information 
regarding the security of WLANs. 
Statistical Type Count 
Average 3.4 
Minimum I 
Maximum 5 
Median 4 
Table 36- Information source sf::tistics 
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Of the seven sources of infonnation listed, the most common 
sources used were the print media (90 percent), and colleagues 
(70 percent). For a complete breakdown of the results of question 
3, sec Table 37 below. 
Information Source Count % 
Print media 9 90 
Colleaguc(s) 7 70 
WLAN hardware vendor 5 50 
Other, general Intemet site 5 50 
Security Intcm·~t site 4 40 
Mailing list 3 30 
Other* 2 20 
Table 37- Sources of information regarding WLAN security 
*The other sources of information were consultants and seminars. 
These results are compared to and combined with the results of 
Question 3 in section 4.2.14. 
4.2.11. Question 11 resuUs 
The ten respondents who do not have WLANs but are aware of 
security issues regarding them were then asked if their awareness 
had affected their decisions about testing and/or implementing 
WLAN technology. 
Eight of the 10 or 80 percent said Yes, the security issues had 
affected their decision'>, two said No. 
The interviewees who answered Yes were then asked to expand 
on their answers. From these comments, the following emerged. 
Three of the respondents mentioned that they were waiting for the 
standards and/or public perception of the security risks to improve 
before they even looked at WLANs (Respondents 4, 11, 17). 
"We're fairly conservative and cautious about security here , .. so 
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we're quite prepared to sit back and wait to see how the standards 
and technologies change to reduce the risk" (Respondent 17). 
This reluctance is similar to that expressed by respondents 13 and 
16 in section 4.2.9. The comments indicate that the interviewees 
expect that the technology will eventually mature to a point where 
the risk is acceptable. 
Two of the respondents, one from government and the other from 
mining and exploration, expressed major concerns about exposing 
information about their organisations to others. "Because we are 
in a political environment and things that go on in here could 
cause headlines and a great deal of embarrassment, security is 
very important to us, so if we know that there is a risk it would be 
a mistake to try and implement it and expose ourselves" 
(Respondent 3). " ... we are also involved in the uranium and 
.mclear industry so we wouldn't like to sort of make ourselves too 
easy a target for industrial espionage" (Respondent 13). 
In this case, both respondents are demonstrating a distrust of the 
technology and a belief that wireless cannot offer confidentiality. 
Respondent 18, from a mining and exploration organisation stated 
that WLAN security problems had caused his organisation to 
defer implementing a WLAN that they had planned to put in place 
in the middle of2002. 
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4.2.12. Question 12 results 
Question 12 was an open-ended question that asked the 
interviewees if they had any reasons other than security for not 
testing or implementing WLAN technology. From the fourteen 
responses to this question, the following data emerged. 
Cost 
Five of the fourteen respondents stated that cost was currently a 
significant restriction to implementing WLAN technology. The 
IT manager for a large Perth hotel said that cost was the reason 
they were not currently looking at wireless. "We've got a V1~ry 
small IT budget for the next 24 months so we're not doing 
anything 'speccy' [sic]" (Respondent 10). 
Another respondent stated that as far as he was concerned, 
security was the biggest factor but "the company would always 
say that cost was the most important" (Respondent 11 ). 
These respondents felt that the cost of implementing WLAN 
technology was not justified by the benefits gained by moving to 
wireless technology. 
The issue of cost arises again in the anecdotal infonnation 
collected. See section 4.2.13. 
Lack of Business Drivers 
Five of the respondents gave reasons that were to do with the 
perceived lack of business drivers for implementing wireless. 
Generally, they felt that the benefits of wireless were not 
significant enough to warrant the cost and effort of implementing 
it. 
One respondent remarked that there had not been any great 
demand from his users (Respondent 3) while another did not see 
the need to move to wireless because they were satisfied with 
their current. network configuration (Respondent 12). 
These respondents indicated that the impetus for moving to new 
technologies would generally come from the users. At this stage, 
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these users had not made any significant demands to incorporate 
wireless into their networks. 
Speed and Bandwidth 
Two of the people interviewed felt that the speed of wireless did 
not measure up to other available technologies. "You can run a 1 
gig network at the moment and you wouldn't get close to that on 
wireless (Respondent 11 )". One finance company had looked at 
using WLAN technology to act as a bridge between two buildings 
but ended up running a fibre-optic cable under the road instead. 
This decision was made because of the slowness of wireless 
compared to optic fibre. 
Other Reasons 
Two of the fourteen respondents had no other reason, other than 
security, for failing to take up wireless LAN technology 
(Respondents 13 and 17). One interviewee stated that he was 
currently too busy to look at wireless properly; he had looked at 
wireless briefly, but was put off by all the security issues. He felt 
there were other areas within his organisation that needed 
attention more than wireless (Respondent 18). 
Another organisation had considered wireless and had reached the 
point where they asked Cisco to do a site survey. This survey 
found that the building the organisation is currently occupying 
had too much cabling in the roof and too much steel in the walls 
and ceilings. The composition of the building means that if the 
organisation wants to use wireless, they could only achieve 
horizontal transmissions across each floor; vertical transmissions 
between floors would be impossible (Respondent 4). 
This was the only respondent who indicated that their premises 
were not suitable to wireless. This issue has received very little 
press in the push for wireless technology. 
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Question 12 Summary 
After scrutinising the responses to question 12, the summary 
information given below in Table 38 and Figure 23 was 
generated. 
Note that three respondents gave more than one other reason for 
not taking up wireless technology. 
Respondent 1 found both cost and a lack of business drivers to be 
reasons, respondent 3 stated that after security, bandwidth and a 
lack of need were issues, and respondent 11 felt that cost and 
bandwidth were both significant, after security. 
Reason Count % 
Cost 5 3I 
No drivers 5 3I 
Speed or bandwidth 3 I3 
No other reason 2 I3 
Unsuitable premises I r, 
Too busy I 6 
Total I7 100 
Table 38 -Reasons for not using WLAN technology (other 
than security) 
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Cost 
29% 
Too busy 
6% 
Unsuitable 
preilllSes 
6% 
No Drivers 
29% 
No other 
reason 
12% 
Speed or 
Bandwidt 
18% 
Figure 23 - Reasons for not using WLAN technology (other 
than security) 
These figures may be compared to those found by the SECURE 
Computing market research (see section 2.2.2 for details). This 
research found that security was the biggest obstacle to deploying 
WLANs, followed by cost. 
4.2.13. Anecdotal responses 
At the completion of the structured questions, the researcher 
explained to each respondent that the study was not testing any 
hypothesis and that anecdotal evidence was being collected. The 
interviewees were then invited to add anything that they felt 
might be relevant. The statements that were made by the 
respondents were analysed and then arranged into the following 
categories: 
• Security related comments; 
• Cost issues; 
• Business driver issues; 
• Speed and bandwidth comments; 
• Interference problems; 
• hnmature technology; 
• Current and potential u&.::s; :md 
• The future. 
Security related comments 
Thirteen of the twenty respondents made comments about the 
secu.rity of wireless. 
One organisation is planning to install a WLAN towards the end 
of 2003. The person interviewed from that organisation expects 
that by ~he time the WLAN is rolled out, the security issues would 
be resolved (Respondent 5) . 
.. 1 think security is an issue. I'm sure it will be addressed by the 
vendors and software companies with their security and 
encryption tools over time" (Respondent 7). 
"I see no reason once those sort of issues are addressed why we 
wouldn't be doing it ... The technology is probably just a bit early 
for us yet because of the security issues, but once that's settled, 
we'll be more than happy to 00 looking at it and putting it in" 
(Respondent 17). 
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Though many of these comments were about the current security 
problems, there was a general expectation that the shortfalls in 
WLAN security will be fixed in the near future. 
Two of the respondents mentioned seminars that they had 
attended regarding the security of WLANs. At one seminar, a 
security consultant from the United States demonstrated the 
inadequacy of the security of some Perth WLANs. The 
demonstration showed that these WLANs had been set up using 
default configurations and that they were highly vulnerable to 
unauthorised access. 
When prompted for more infonnation about the seminar, the 
respondent made a comment in regards to people's knowledge of 
security issues. 
"I mean a lot of people effectively have relatively limited 
knowledge with how you should properly encrypt a network. 
Some of them will be deploying default technology especially if it 
is unmanaged. If not, then in default encryption mode, which is 
very easy to break. The gist of the presentation was that you 
shouldn't put your faith into out~of~thc~box solutions" 
(Respondent 16). 
Another respondent made a similar comment about "off~the· 
shelf' implementations. " ... People aren't implementing it 
properly, they are just whacking in an off-the·shelfproduct, and 
putting in a few cards and seeing how it goes, not realising that 
there are shared bandwidth issues" (Respondent 20). 
These concerns were strengthened by two other respondents who 
stated that they were not aware of any security problems with 
WLANs. 
"I didn't know there were any security issues... It's certainly 
something that we will need to consider. Now that I've been 
made aware of it, I will have to look into it" (Respondent 8). 
"Security is something I hadn't really thought of' (Respondent 9). 
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As both these respondents were planning to implement WLANs 
in the future, this lack of awareness is disconcerting. 
Other security-related comments indicated that the security issues 
were holding organisations back from deploying WLANs. 
"I guess it's a technology that we're interested in pursuing but the 
security issues just come up every time so we've said no, we're 
not going to touch it yet, we'll wait and see" (Respondent 17). 
"It's something we recognise that it's easy to deploy it but it's not 
easy to deploy it securely. We need a lot more time to make sure 
we do it properly" (Respondent 5). 
These comments tie back to the responses to questions 11 where 
eight out of 10 respondents had stated that security issues had 
affected their decisions about testing or implementing WLAN 
technology. 
Some security countenneasures such as doing external scans and 
having your network independently audited were discussed. 
"You can reduce the actual output of the access point so that you 
don't radiate outside your building, so you reduce that down ... 
we would probably do scans around the building to make sure 
that our signals are not being transmitted outside" (Respondent 
5). 
"We employ consultants who frequently work with us to ensure 
that our wireless network conforms to industry best practices" 
(Respondent 15). 
The mention of these countermeasures is evidence of an 
awareness that there are methods for reducing the risks of using 
WLAN technology. 
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Cost issues 
There were conflicting opinions about whether WLANs would be 
a cost burden or a cost saving. 
A security consultant felt quite strongly that it was not yet cost 
effective. "While it's not cost effective, forget it. It's the simple 
answer, it doesn't matter how good it is, if it's not cost effective. 
In the commercial world, cost is an even bigger bsue than 
security" (Respondent 6). 
This opinion was countered by another respondent from a 
government department who felt that implementing a WLAN 
could result in a cost saving. "We can see the benefits from cost 
savings in relocations and office changes for a start ... just the 
physical costs of moving and putting new points in walls and 
cabling ... we're sure to save money" (Respondent 17). 
The comment from respondent 6 reflects the opinions of many 
others. Cost was stated as a reason for not implementing WLAN 
technology by five of the 14 respondents to question 12 (see 
section 4.2.12) and in the results of the SECURE Computing 
market research, cost was the second biggest obstacle to 
implementing WLANs. However, the comment from respondent 
17 demonstrates that the respondent has perhaps looked more 
closely at how wireless might be of benefit to his or her 
organisation. If an organisation has to cater for a flexible 
workforce, where people change offices or departments 
frequently, then wireless may prove more cost effective than fixed 
wiring. 
Business driver issues 
Many comments were made about the COhlmercial reasons for 
businesses not implementing WLANs. "I think [aJ lack of 
commercial factors would be the main issue why people don't 
take it up" (Respondent 16). 
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Four respondents (respondents 3, 7 12 and 13) commented that 
for their organisations, they did not currently have any reasons for 
putting in WLANs. 
"I guess we'll review what benefits we'd get out of it, we have 
thought about it but at the moment we haven't seen any real need 
to go to wireless, so we'll keep an eye on it and review any 
possibilities" (Respondent 12). 
"There's so much investment in existing network infrastructure, 
there's no point in junking that for the convenience of not having 
a few cables" (Respondent 13). 
These comments are similar to remarks made in answer to 
question 12. See section 4.2.12. 
Some of these comments reflect the respondents' beliefs that 
wireless is used as a replacement for wired networks. WLAN 
technology is most oftea used as an adjunct to, rather than as a 
replacement of, wired networks in order to provide flexibility and 
portability where needed. There is generally no need to "junk 
existing infrastructure". 
Speed and bandwidth comments 
There were also conflicting opinions about whether the bandwidth 
ofWLANs is sufficient for most networks. 
One interviewee stated that bandwidth was not as important as 
network stability. He mentioned that his organisation had been 
offered, by the owners of the building, a }~gigabyte fibre~optic 
network medium but he said, "I don't see the benefit to changing 
from what we are doing at the moment" (Respondent 14). 
Another point of view is that bandwidth is not as important as 
others make out. "People put too much weight on bandwidth. 
[The need for] a lot of bandwidth ... has come because a lot of 
software and different applications are so inefficient with the way 
they communicate. We've actually got some satellite 
communications that we use here and that's relatively small 
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bandwidth compared to fibre optics and other Jandline stuff' 
(Respondent 13). 
In contrast to this, others felt that wireless could not deliver the 
same content they get with their existing network infrastructure. 
"We are now running everything at lOOmbps. We use [our 
networks] to deliver video, we use them to do a lot of other things 
and I'm not quite sure that wireless will work that well in those 
sorts of scenarios" (Respondent 3). 
"The actual bandwidth ... and throughput on the LAN [is] still 
pretty ordinary .... you can do your nonnal work through that but 
if you start to really try and do heavy load type stuff, [wireless] 
jus:· can't cope with that" (Respondent 18). 
"Though they talk about 11 meg, the realistic throughput is 
nothing like that. ... we have to wait for the technology to mature 
enough to give us the required bandwidth" (Respondent 19). 
As with the business driver issues in the previous section, these 
responden~s seem to be talking about wireless as a replacement 
for fixed~ wire networks. 
Immature technology 
Two respondents felt that wireless LA.~ technology is still too 
immature to consider using it at this stage. One of these 
respondents described wireless as 'bleeding edge' technology. 
"Wireless seemed to be a little bit too 'bleeding edge'... If you 
are on the cutting edge or the bleeding edge you just are burnt 
every time, and it is expensive. It is not worth the headache. 
We'll let the technology sort itself out and then look into it" 
(Respondent 12). 
"!t's something t:1at we had a look at, sort of 12 or 18 months ago 
but we didn't even dip our feet in the water ... .It's relatively new 
in the lifespan of the technology so we thought we'd sit on the 
fence a bit longer" (Respondent 13). 
Similar comments were made in response to Question 9. 
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Labelling a technology as "bleeding edge" infers an untested 
technology or technology so new that its ramifications on the 
stability of a system or business have not yet been determined. It 
also implies that a failure of this technology may hurt the bufiness 
or system. 
Interference problems 
One interviewee talked about how his organisation had caused 
some interference problems with a wireless bridge they had 
installed between two buildings. "We're interfering with others 
and they're interfering with us, knocking out our signal. We were 
interfering with a retail outlet that sold satellite navigation 
equipment" (Respondent 19). 
As there is a limited amount of bandwidth available to 802.11 b 
WLAN technology, interference may be inevitable, however there 
are several channels available to users to attempt to rectify 
interference problems. 
Current and potential uses 
Many of the comments made to the researcher were to do with 
current or potential uses for wireless LAN technology. 
One government organisation uses wirele3s for special events but 
does not currently use it within their internal network 
(Respondent 2). 
Another government organisation uses wireless but mainly 
because one of their buildings is heritage listed which precludes 
them from using fixed cabling (Respondent 15). 
Two of the three mining and exploration companies interviewed 
could see potential applications for wireless technology for their 
organisations. 
Respondent 18 is the IT manager at one of these companies. This 
respondent mentioned that the organisation currently have 
problems at mining sites in getting communications from the 
workers in the bottom of a pit to the ¥Jorkers at the top. Currently 
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.hey use very expensive satellite and mobile phone 
communications but see wireless as being a very good candidate 
to replace the current system. 
"We've got a huge amount of data thal's transmitted from the 
haul pack trucks which are on the move all the time, we have a 
control tower on top of the hill, they're monitoring a continuous 
stream of data from eaGh truck, from each shovel, from each 
crane .. , the whole thing, they are all connected. At the moment 
we arc using radio, GPS, satellite, it's actually quite sophisticated. 
I sec wireless as getting down from the big Lits of equipment that 
can carry that sort of transmission equipment to the person who 
can't, and hopefully replacing their mobile with a connection 
point, probably through PDAs, that's where we envision it going" 
(Respondent 18). 
Ano~;er mining and exploration company has used wireless in 
point-to-point communications at a remote mining site. "We 
would use the [access point] to do distance communication 
without cabling ... we've done a lot of that up in the northwest 
where cabling is very difficult ... so we usc it point to point in 
bridge mode" (Respondent 5). 
This same organisation intends to use WLAN technology to 
improve the mobility of its workers, but not until they move 
buildings. "In the new building we're going to have a lot of , .. 
collaboration areas, where people will be able to ... sit down and 
have a meeting. The whole idea is to give people the flexibility to 
work where they want. We will still be running IPTel over 
wireless as well, ... so they can just sit [in the collaboration area} 
and it's like they are sitting at their desk, their telephone's here 
connected to the network (Respondent 5). 
Anoth-:-r organisation mentioned that they were also moving 
premises and would look at wireless again when it was time to 
develop the infrastructure for the new building (Respondent 7). 
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Shifting locations presents an ideal time for an organisation to 
incorporate wireless technology into the corporate network, as the 
organisation has not spent money on a wired infrastructure. 
Other respondents spoke of using wireless in ad hoc situations 
where users are bringing laptop computers into a meeting or 
training room (Respondents 8, 12 and 19). 
The future 
A few respondents made comments regarding the future of 
wireless, both within their own organisations and in general. 
"In the commercial world it will be interesting to see whether they 
pick up wireless as a preferred option because whilst they have 
systems that are hard-wired ... and it's up and working they would 
see no reason to install it" (Respondent 6). 
This remark, as with the comments on cost, and busines:; driver 
issues in previous sections, indic<~tes that the respondent views 
wireless as a replacement for wired networks. This view is not 
shared by respondent 7. 
"I don't believe it's going to be a total replacement for current 
network infrastructures. It will be an additional or an optional 
sort of set up that an organisation will adopt so they will still have 
fixed cabling throughout buildings and wireless will be more of a 
tool to allow some sort of mobility but it won't be a complete 
replacement" (Respondent 7). 
One respondent made comments regarding his perception of the 
state of the IT industry, and how wireless might be affected by it. 
"I think that wireless's time is coming. I think wireless is 
probably one of the areas ofiT that is likely to either not diminish 
in size and importance but if anything grow. I personaHy see a 
big downturn coming in the IT industry; I think it's already 
beginning or begun. Pretty much, post 2000 and all the fear that 
came out of Y2K and all the waste of mon~y that was spent... 
wireless I think could be a little bit immune to that because it's 
addressing a new upcoming market" (Respondent 13). 
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One other respondent spoke of not implementing new technology 
just for the sake of it. 
"It's really about making sure that whatever we do has a really 
useful business application. We're not doing it just for the fun, 
there [has] to be a very real business problem that we are trying to 
resolve and there has to be benefit to solving the problem. If 
there's no benefit out of fixing it, I won't fix it. We wUI only do 
wireless when I can see there's value in it" (Respondent 18). 
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4.2.14. Phase 2 summary data 
The survey instrument used in phase 2 was a questionnaire that 
was divided into two sections. Section A was answered by those 
organisations that do or have implemented a WLAN. Section B 
was answered by those organisations that have not yet 
implemented any WLAN technology. Two questions were 
duplicated in each section. 
Questions 2 and 9 
Question 2 (in section A) and Question 9 (in section B) asked the 
respondents "Are you aware of any security implications of using 
WLANs?" If the respondents answered Yes, they were then 
asked to expand on their answers. This question was deliberately 
left as an open question rather than giving the respondents an 
exhaustive list of known WLAN security problems from which to 
choose. This was because the researcher did not want to 
influence the answers in any way. An exhaustive list might have 
encouraged the respondents to say they were aware of particular 
problems when in fact they were not. 
Six out of six interviewees who responded to question two 
answered in the affinnative, and ten out of 14 respondents who 
answered question 9 did the same. The combined results from 
this question are that 16 out of 20 interviewees were in some way 
aware of security problems with WLANs. 
Questiuns 3 and 10 
The other question that appeared in both sections was "How were 
you made aware of these implications?" This was question 3 in 
Section A and question 10 in Section B. 
Comparative Results 
The results of question 3 (organisations with WLANs) showed 
that mailing lists, security web sites, and colleagues (66.7 percent 
each) were the most commonly used sources of WLAN security 
infonnation. This compares to the results of question 10 
(organisations without WLANs) which showed that the print 
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media (90 percent), and t:olleagues 00 percent) were the most 
common sources. 
These results may indicate that those persons responsible for 
WLANs are possibly more likely to seek out information 
regarding security (by subscribing to mailing lh:ts and visiting 
security-based web sites), whereas the respondents from 
organisations that do not have WLANs may learn of the issues 
without intentionally seeking the information (via the print 
media). 
Combined Results 
These questions were answered by 16 respondents (those who had 
said Yes to either question 2 or question 9). 
For individual results, please refer to sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.10. 
The combined results are as follows: 
Of the seven sources of information listed, the most common 
sources used were the print media (75 ,ercent), hardware vendors, 
colleagues and mailing lists (50 percent each). For a complete 
breakdown of the combined results of questions 3 and 10, see 
Table 39 below. 
Information Source Count % 
Print media 12 75.0 
Colleague(s) II 68.8 
WLAN hardware vendor 8 50.0 
Security Internet site 8 50.0 
Mailing list 7 43.8 
Other, general Internet site 7 43.8 
Other* 3 18.8 
Table 39- Sources of information regarding WLAN security 
*The other sources were seminars (2) and consultants. 
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5. Discussion 
As recently as May 2002, a computer security journalist stated that there was "a 
disparity between the amount of wireless activity in the corporate community and 
the low level of awareness of the vulnerability nf radio local area networks" 
(Couzins, 2002). In regards to Perth, this statement is not supported by the results 
of phase 2 of this study, which shows that 80 percent of participating 
organisations were aware of the security issues related to WLAN technology. 
The statement by Couzins is also refuted by the results of phase 1 of this study 
which showed that on average 63 percent of the 134.8 detected infrastructure 
networks had enabled WEP leaving 37 percent unprotected. Reports publishe-d 
earlier, in Australia anC overseas, give much higher figures of unprotected 
networks. For example, in January 2002, Mackenzie reported that more than 80 
percent of corporate wireless networks detected in Sydney, Australia had no 
security whatsoever (2002). Similar reports were made on the state of security of 
WLANs in the United States and London. The US scans found that only about 39 
percent had enabled WEP while the report on the London scan showed that over 
two thirds of the networks were unprotected. 
As the specific methodological details of these scans were not reported, it is 
difficult to compare the results to those found in phase 1 of this study. However, 
the results of this study indicate that awareness and security tool usage are 
significantly higher than may have b:.""f!n expected. 
This reduction in the number of unprotected networks is significant and may be a 
result of an increased awareness of the problems associated with WLAN security. 
The results of this study show that a lower percentage of WLANs have not 
changed the default settings. The Barnes text stated that nearly 40 percent of 
WLANs had yet to change their configuration from the factory default (2002, p. 
315). In Perth, this proportion was measured at only 15 percent. 
Much of the literature that was read in preparation for this thesis implied or stated 
that a large proportion ofWLANs lack even basic security. This deficiency was 
blamed on a lack of knowledge on behalf of those responsible for implementing 
and/or managing the wireless networks. The results from both phases of this 
study demonstrate that in Perth, this implication is not true. Neither is the 
assertion that there is a lack of knowledge regarding the security implications of 
wireless networks. 
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The results of phase two of this study show that among the study participants 
there is quite a high level of understanding of the benefits and limitations of 
WLAN technology. 
One hundred percent of the government departments that participated in the study 
were aware of the security implications, as were all of the organisations that 
classified themselves as mining and industry. 
It also emerged that larger organisations showed a greater awareness of the 
security problems. All 10 organis;;.lions that have more than 100 network nodes 
were aware ofWLAN security probiems. 
Those respondents with WLANs had a higher awareness of specific problems, 
especially with the built in encryption, however some of those without WLANs 
knew more about issues like war driving and the problems associated with poorly 
configured WLANs. 
In summary, the results of this study show that in Perth the majority of those 
persons responsible for the implementation and management of wireless networks 
are aware of the problems and have taken steps to secure their networks. 
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6. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to investigate and report on the levels of usage of 
wireless LAN technology in Perth, as well as the levels of knowledge of the 
security issues surrounding WLANs. 
In the introduction to this thesis the issues presented were why WLANs are 
becoming more popular, how the security of WLANs differs from the security of 
wired networks, and what types of atta1~ks may be (and have been) perpetrated 
against WLANs. This study was initiated to determine how WLAN security 
issues affect Perth organisations. 
The literature review showed that WLAN security was proved vulnerable as early 
as March 2000. By August 2001, free software tools were available that could 
determine encryption keys from captured packets. It was shown that increasing 
the length of the key did not negatively affect the capability of these tools. Many 
authors felt that WLANs '.vould need third party tools to be made secure. The 
literature showed that the built~in encryption did not meet its stated goal, which 
was to provide privacy that was equivalent to the level provided by a wired 
network. New standards are under development to rectify this shortfall. 
The general aims of the first phase were 1o detennine how many WLA:·:, were 
detectable in the Perth CBD and the percentage that have enabled WEP. These 
aims were achieved. Additionally, phase 1 was able to show how many WLANs 
were still using the manufacturer's default settings and how the network devices 
may be grouped according to manufacturer. 
The results of phase 1 were limited by several factors. The regions scanned did 
not incorporate suburban areas so home networks were not included in the results. 
The antenna used was a directional antenna and as the researcher was not able to 
reposition the antenna whilst driving, some networks may not have been detected. 
Timing of the scans may also have had an impact on the results. These factors not 
withstanding, the results were fairly consistent across the five scans. The results 
are themselves limited by the fact that they are only a snapshot of what was 
happening at the time of the research. 
The general aims of the second phase were to find out if the IT managers of 
various Perth organisations were aware of the security issues related to WLANs 
and also to find out the degree to which the security tools and processes have been 
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implemented. These mms were also achieved and in addition, anecdotal 
information was collected and analysed. 
The results of this study are significant within the Perth IT community because 
they show that the participants have an understanding of the benefits and 
limitations of wireless, but also a reluctance to implement it too quickly. 
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7. Further Study 
The scope of this research project was limited by the time and resources available 
to the researcher. As a consequence, there is plenty of scope for future research 
based on, and relating to, the findings of this study. 
The methodology of the phase 1 research could be expanded to detennine: 
• if different scanning software produced different sets of results; 
• if using different antennas produced different results; 
• if the timing of the scans affected the results; and 
• if the weather and temperature of the equipment affected the results. 
The results of phase 2 could be verified by conducting case studies of 
organisations that have implemented WLANs to detennine what they use them 
for, how they are configured, what security tools are in place, and how they are 
connected to any wired networks. 
98 
References 
Airsnort software available from http://airsnort.shmoo.com/ 
AirSnort Tool Cracks WEP in 15 minutes (2001). Computer Fraud and Security 
Journal. September, 2001. p. 5 
Andress, M. (2002). Wireless J_,Ocal Area Network Security. Retrieved June, 2002 
from: http://www. wmrc.com/busincssbnc!ingl 
Arbaugh, W., Shankar, N. and Wan, Y.C. (2001). Your 802.11 Wireless Network has 
no Clothes. Retrieved May, 2002 from: www.cs.umd.edu/-waa!wireless.pdf 
Babbie, E. (l992). The Practise of Social Research. 61h Edition. Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, California. 
Barnes, C., Bautts, T., Lloyd, D., Oullet, E., Posluns, J., Zendzian, D. (2002). Hack 
proofing your Wireless Network. Syngress Publishing Inc. USA 
Batista, E. (Nov 15, 2002). Wi-Fi Encryption Fix Not Perfect Retrieved November, 
2002 from: http://www.wired.com/ncws 
Blackwell, G. (January, 2002). Serious WLAN Security Threats: Part II. Retrieved 
July, 2002 from: www.80211-plantc.com/columns 
Borisov, N., Goldberg, I., Wagner, D. (2001). Intercepting Mobile Communications: 
The Insecurity of802.11. Retrieved May, 2002 from: http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu 
Borisov, N., Goldberg, L, Wagner, D. (2001). Security of the WEP algorithm. 
Retrieved May, 2002 from: http://www.isaac.cs.berkclcy.edu/isaac/wen-faq.html 
Brewin, B. (June, 2002). Nets Exponsed by 'rogue' threats. Computerworld. Volume 
36. Retrieved July, 2002 from: Proque5t database. 
Brewin, B. (August, 2002). War flying: Wireless LAN sniffing goes airborne. 
Computerworld. Retrieved January, 2003 from: www.computerworld.com quicklink# 
32566 
Bre\dn, B. (September, 2002). Worldwide 'war drive' exposes insecure wireless LANs. 
Retrieved January, 2003 from http://www.computerworld.com 
Chandra, P (2002). Security in Wireless Networks. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
http://www .columbia.edu/itc/ce/c6951 /2002spring/Projects/CVN/rcport l.pdf 
Cohen, F. (2001). The Wireless Revolution. Network Security Journal. June, 2001. p. 
17 
Computer Security Grants Program. National Institute of Standards and Technology-
Critical Infrastructure Grants Program- Computer Security Division. Retrieved July, 
2002 from: http://csrc.nist.govhu·ants/awards.html 
Couzins, M. (May 2002). Wireless networks- is yours secure?. Computer Weekly, 
May 23, 2002 p54. Retrieved July, 2002 from Expanded Academic ASAP database. 
Cox, J. (October, 2002). Wireles LAN attacks grow in sophistication. Retrieved 
November 2002 from: Proquest database. 
Creswell, J. W. (1998). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design. Sage Publications. 
California. 
De Spi~geleire, K. (2001). Wireless LANs: the new vulnerability? Security 
Management Today. December, 2001. p.Sl 
99 
Douglas, J. V. (September, 2002). Home LANs risk accidental hacks. Retrieved 
February, 2003 from http://ncws.zdnet.eo.uk/ 
Ellison, C. (2002). Wireless LANs at Risk. Retrieved April, 2002 from: 
http: if\, ww. pc Ill a g. com 
Flickenger, R. (2001) Antenna on the Cheap. Retrieved March, 2002 from: 
http:/ I w w w .orci 11 vnct. com/ c s/wcb log/vi cw I w 1 g/448 
Fluhrer, S., Mantin,l., Shamir, A. (2001) Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm 
ofRC4. Retrieved May, 2002 from: 
http:/ I down 1 o~ld s. sec uri 1 y !l1cus. com/] i brary/ rc4 ksaproc. pdf 
Gast, M. (2002). 802.11 Wireless Networks The definitive guide. O'Reilly and 
Associates, USA. 
Gast, M. (2002). Wireless LAN Security: A Short History. Retrieved May, 2002 from: 
\\W\\'. orei 11 vnet .c om/1 pt/ a/ /w i rc 1 css/2002/04/ I 9/ security. htm I 
How to Build a tin can Waveguide antenna. Retrieved January, 2003 from: 
ht I p ://w ww. 1 urn poi at. nct/wi rc 1 css/ cant en nahowt o. h tm I 
IEEE OUI and Company ID Assignments. Retrieved January, 2003 from: 
hIt p :/I standards. i ccc. andre gau th/ ou iii ndex . shtm I 
Intel- Wireless Security and VPN. (2001) Retrieved April, 2002 from: 
ht 1 p :I /www. i ntc 1. com/ network/ con nee t i vi t y/resourccs/ doc I i brary/ documents/pd f/W LO 
Security WP LOWrcz \.pdf 
Johnson, B. C. (2002). Wireless 802.11 LAN Security: Understanding the Key Issues. 
SystemExperts Corporation. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
http://www. system ex pcrts .co m/t u tors/ w i rc I css- issues. pdf 
Karygiannis, T. and Owens, L. (September, 2002). Wireless Network Security. 
Retrieved November, 2002 from: 
http:/ I csrc. n i st. !.!O v /pub 1 i cations/ d ralls/ dra n -sp800-48. pdf 
Kershaw, M. (2002). Linux 802.1\b and wireless (in)security. Retrieved May, 2002 
from: !ill.P: I /w\vw .1 i nux security. com/ f cat u re stori es/wi relcss-k ism ct. h tm I 
Lancaster, T. (2002). VPN Termination. Retrieved May, 2002 from 
http://scarchnctworking.tcchtargct.com/tip/ 1 ,289483 ,sid7 gci8157 58,00.html 
Leyden, J. (2001 ). Rogue WLA~s- the next security battlefield?. Retrieved May, 2002 
from: h t 1 p :/ lwww. thcrcgi st er. co.u kl con t cnt/5 5/20920. html 
Mackenzie, K. (2002a). Wireless Network:; Unprotected. Retrieved March, 2002 from: 
http://australiani t.ncw.com.au 
Mackenzie, K. (2002b). Wireless Protection Nightmare. The Australian. p.31 
Maxim, M. and Pollino, D. (2002). Wireless Security. McGraw Hill. California USA. 
Mills, K. (2001 ). Tum on wireless encryption to tune out hack1!rs. Retrieved May, 2002 
from: http://www.computcrworld.com.au 
Miller, S. K. (July 2001 ). Facing the Challenge of Wireless Security. Technology 
News. July,200l.p.18 
Mitchell, M. and Jolley, J. (1988). Research Design Explained. Holt, Rinehart and 
Windston, Inc. New York. 
PC Webopaedia (2002). Definition ofDHCP. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
http://www.pcwcbopacdia.com/TERM/D/DHCP.html 
100 
PC Webopaedia (2002). Definition of SSID. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
http:.'/\\\\'\\' .pcm:bopaedia.com/TE R l\.1 /SISS I D.html 
Pollino, D. (2002). How to secure an office wireless network. Ne~work Security 
Journal. January, 2002. p. 12-13 
Rothberg, A. (March, 2002) Tales of a White Hat War Driver. Retrieved July, 2002 
from \\-w~--=-LlfL'! 11 )'!lC\Rl_t_~ljpJ 'a: /wire lcss~OCJ" 103/29/wanlrivcr.htm! 
Savage, M. (September, 2001 ). Insecure WLANs Face Risk of Athck. Computer 
RescUer News. September 2001. p. 49. Retrieved July, 2002 from: Expanded Academic 
ASAP. 
Schenk, R., Garcw, A., lwanchuk, R., (August 2001). Wirless LAN Deployment and 
Security Basics. Retrieved July, 2002 from: \\'\\"W.cxtrcmctcch.col\l 
Shipley, P. (200! ). Retrieved June, 2002 from: www.wardriving.corn/about 
Simon, D., Aboba, B., and Moore, T. (2000). IEEE 802.11 Security and 802.1X. 
Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
!ilip: -'..'www. iel'eSt P .<1[g I m irror..'S02 1 /docs 'lfJ()()/!-:021 x Sccurit y.PDF 
Sproull, N. (1988). Handbook of Research Method~~ 2m1 Edition. Scarecrow Press, Inc. 
USA. 
SSID Defaults. Retrieved January, 2003 from: 
http://www. wi 2WO.org/mediawhore/n fU/wircless/ssid dcfaults/ssid dclaults~ 1.0.5. txt 
Stewart, J. (2000). Connecting with Confidence. Web Techniques. Volume 5. 
Retrieved May, 2002, from: ProQuest database. 
Stubblefield, A., Joannidis, J., and Rubin, A. D. (August 2001). Using the Fluhrer. 
Mantin, and Shamir Attack to Break WEP. AT&T Labs Technical Report TD-4ZCPZZ 
Szerszen, D. (2001 ). Wireless Networking: Nirvana or Nightmare? N~:twork Security 
Journal. November, 2001. p. 7 
The 'Michael' Vulnerability. (December, 2002). Retrieved January 7.003 from: 
http://www.R0211-p1anct.com.columns 
Tl-te National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. (September, 2002). Retrieved January, 
2003 from: hlifl_;;'f!'::\\'\\'. whi.tchousc.gov/pcipb/cybcrstratcgv~dra n.html. 
Trochim, W. M. K. (2002). Deduction and Induction. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
http://trochiln.humar:.con1e11.edut;.;b/dcdind.htn! 
Tu\litt, J. (June, 2002). Security Concerns Overshadow WLAN Boom. Retrieved 
January, 2003 from: http :/!www .check ~mark.com/securecomputing'2002 06/wlan/ 
Veri sign~ Securing Globe! Roaming for 802.11 WLAN~ C~On?~. Retrieved April, 2002 
from: !HJll:!lww\\'. \'Crisign.cnm 
Walker, J.R. (2000). Unsafe at any key size: An analysis of the WEP encapsulation. 
Retrieved May, 2002 from: http://www.tlrin:le.com/--aboba!l·t~EE.~ 
Webb, S. G. (2002). Wireless InSecurity- Current Issue'> with Se~;uring WLAN's 
utilising 802.11 b technology. Proceedings of the 3ru Australian Infommtion Warfare and 
Security Conference 2002. Edith Cowan University. Perth, Western Australia 
WEP Security Statement . Wireless Ethernet Compatibility Alliance. (September, 
2001 ). Retrieved April, 2002 from: http://www. Wi~ 
li.com/pdf/20011 () 15 \VEP Sccurity.pdf 
WEP: ready in 15 minutes (2001 ). Network Security Journal. August, 2001. p.4 
I OJ 
Whitney, D. (2001 ). Business Continuity with Wireless So~utions. Retrieved May, 
2002 from: http: .'\\ ww.ro:l!web.com/cisco.·T o:chWorkshonstDrcwWirelcss.pdf 
Wi-Fi Alliance Announces Standards-Based Security Solution to Replace WEP. 
Retrieved November, 2002 from: http:.:/www.wi-ti.com 
Wireless DeMilitarized Zone (WDMZ) Entcrusys Networks' Best Practices Approach 
to an Interoperable WI.AN Security Solution. Retrieved March, 2002 from: 
http:: :w\\ \\' .o:nterasvs.c<.1m prndut:,ts-'whi lcpapersiw LANDMZBestPracticcs.pd f 
Wireless LAN Benefits Sh1dy (Fall, 2002). Conducted by NOP World Technology on 
behalf of CISCO Systems. Retrieved July, 2002 from: 
llllp::.'\\ W\~.:.~!!!)PJ~\.:.lJ!-,'_k~.:~~_s.!_l.!!.:.ill.t~~-:..L.6.0''~-;,2(lBencfits'X,20Study!X,20hiYo20Cisco.pdf 
Wireless LANs unprotected in London (2002). Network Security Journal. March, 2002. 
p.2 
Worldwid~_W?fdrivc --Some Frequently Asked Questions (2002). Retrieved January, 
2003 from: ll!tp:i/www. world \\'idcwardri vc.org 
Worldwide Wardrivc Results (2002). Retrieved January, 2003 from: 
hI tp: / i w w ·.v. world wi dew ardri vc .org 
Young, P. (2001). Wireless LANs appeal grows, begs for protection. Computerworld. 
December 3, 2001. p. 4-5 
102 
-~· 
Appendix A -Definitions of terms 
Additional WLAN security tools and processes 
At the time of writing, the following additional security tools and 
processes have been identified. These tools and processes may be 
purchased to increase the security of a WLAN. 
• Implement key·hopping software to allow for the rapid and automated 
update of encryption keys. 
• Implement a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to add secure 
authentication and encryption. 
• Implement proprietary solutions to WLAN vulnerabilities. 
Bandwidth Theft 
Bandwidth theft is where an attacker makes an unauthorised connection to 
a WLAN for the purpose of connecting to the Internet. Though the attack 
is not nonnally malicious, the resources (specifically the bandwidth) of the 
network owner are being used by an unauthorised party (Chandra, 2002). 
Built-in WLAN security tools and processes 
At the time of writing, the following built·in security tools and processes 
have been identified. These tools and processes are readily available to 
WLAN operators. 
• Enable WEP encryption to deter casual eavesdroppers. 
• Change all default identifiers and passwords. 
• Change the default authentication mechanism. 
• Regularly change encryption keys. 
• Disable the broadcast feature of the access point (if available). 
• Configure access points so that they will not respond to "probe-
response" requests (Johnson, 2002). 
• Configure the access points so that they do not offer DHCP for new 
clients (Johnson, 2002). 
• Treat all systems that are connected via 802.llb as external. Place all 
access points outside the firewall. (Stubblefield, lonnidis & Rubin, 
2001; Blackwell, 2002). 
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Detectable wireless networks 
A detectable wireless network is an IEEE 802.11 b standard WLAN of 
which wireless access point beacon signals may be detected using 
?.ppropriate hardware and software. 
DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) 
DHCP is a protocol for assigning dynamic IP addresses to devices on a 
network. With dynamic addressing, a device may have a different IP 
address every time it connects to the network (PC Webopaedia, 2002). If 
you use DHCP, the network will automatically give a hacker configured 
with a stolen SSID a legal IP address. 
Eavesdropping 
In network security, eavesdropping refers to an unauthorised party gaining 
access to a network and then being able to read that network's data. 
Inductive research 
With an inductive study, the researcher does not start with a definitive 
hypothesis that they wish to test. Rather, the researcher believes that after 
some period of observation (during which data is collected and analysed), 
theories may emerge. 
bduction is a largely qualitative research method that is generally used 
where an area of research is relatively new and theories need to be 
developed. Inductive research is often used to generate theories and later 
deductive research may be used to test those theories (Babbie, 1992, p.53). 
MAC (Media Access Control) 
A MAC address is an address that, theoretically, uniquely identifies each 
hardware node of a network. It is built into the network interface card by 
the manufacturer and may be used to identify the manufacturer of the 
network card. Some wireless network interface cards allow you to 
reconfigure them with a new MAC address. Hackers may use this method 
to impersonate a valid network node and thereby gain access to the 
network (Schenk, Garcia & Iwanchuk, 2001 ). 
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RC4 is a stream cipher algorithm. RC4 is the most commonly used stream 
cipher in software applications (Fluhrer, Mantin & Shamir, 2001). It was 
designed by Ron Rivest in 1987 and its algorithm was kept secret until 
1994. WEP is based on the RC4 algorithm. 
Security issues related to WLANs 
At the time of writing, the following security issues that are peculiar to 
WLANs have been identified. 
• The case with which WLANs may be detected and located. 
• The flaws with the built-in security tools that enable hackers to 
intercept and/or modify network data. 
• The availability of security tools incorporated into WLAN 
components. 
• The availability of additional security tools developed for WLANs. 
• The adaptation of wired networks' security tools which may be 
employed to increase the security WLANs. 
SSID (Service Set Identifier) 
An SSID is a 32-charactcr unique identifier attached to the header of 
packets sent over a WLAN that acts as a password when a mobile device 
tries to connect to the network. The SSID differentiates one WLAN from 
another, so all access points and all devices attempting to connect to a 
specific WLAN must usc the same SSID. A device will not be pennitted 
to joi11 the network unless it provides the correct SSID. "Because an SSID 
may be sniffed in plain text from a packet it does not supply any security 
to the network" (PC Webopaedia, 2002). 
War driving 
The tenn "war driving" originated from a practice called "war dialling" 
where an attacker dials a range of phone numbers until a modem answers 
(Andress, 2002). War driving is an attack method used specifically for 
attacking WLANs. It is literally driving around in a motor vehicle looking 
for unsecured wireless networks. 
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Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
WEP is the encryption algorithm that is part of the IEEE 802.1lb standard 
It is defined in the standard as proving protection to authorised users from 
'casual eavesdropping' (cited in Barnes et al., 2002, p. 35). It operates at 
the link layer above the MAC sublayer and is based on the RC4 stream 
cipher. WEP relies on a secret key that is shared between access points 
and wireless devices. The secret key is concatenated with a 24-bit 
initialisation vector (N) and then used to encrypt and decrypt data 
transmissions. 
Wired Network 
A wired network is a computer network in which the nodes are physically 
connected by cable. In a wired network, the network data transmissions 
arc carried via cable. 
WLAN/Wireless Network 
A WLAN/wireless network is a computer network where the nodes are not 
physically connected. In a WLAN, the network data transmissions are 
carried via wireless components such as wireless access points, wireless 
network cards, and antennas. 
IEEE 802.11b standard compliant Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLANs) operate in the unlicensed Industrial, Scientific and Medical 
(ISM) 2.4000 to 2.4835 GHz band and may achieve transfer rates of up to 
liMB/sec. 
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Appendix B- Research documents 
• 
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Initial letter sent to candidates 
Monday, 2 December 2002 
The IT Director/Manager 
<Organisation Name> 
•<Organisation Address> 
Perth W A 6000 
RE: Important research into Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Security 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
The School of Computer and lnfonnation Science (at Edith Cowan University) with 
nearly 2000 students is the largest computing school in Western Australia specialising in 
applied research covering a wide range of disciplines, including computer security, 
software engineering and knowledge management. Strong links with IT industry and 
overseas research centres are the cornerstone of our research strategy. 
Shortly, an honours student from our school will be contacting you regarding research 
into WLAN security. The student's project is concerned with the usage of security tools 
in wireless networks. The results of the research will give an overall pi-..ture of the state 
of WLAN security in Perth. 
This research is significant because there has been an increase in the usage and reliance 
on wired and wireless networks and the commercial confidentiality of some 
organisations may be at risk due to a lack of awareness ofWLAN security implications. 
The honours student, Sue Webb, will contact you shortly to request that your 
organisation participate in her research project. I encourage you to take part as the 
research is significant to all Perth organisations, plus the anonymous results of the 
research will be shared with all participants. These results may assist in increasing your 
organisation's understanding of the security issues relating to WLANs. 
Yours faithfully, 
Dr. Thomas O'Neill 
School of Computer and Infonnation Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Contact Details: 
Dr. Thomas O'Neill (Supervisor) 
Phone: 9370 6431 
email: t.o_neill@ecu.edu.au 
. _,, 
. q ..... -.,~ .. 11:. i :· 
Sue Webb (Honours Student) 
Phone:  
email: swebb@student.ecu.edu.au 
!08 
Covering letter given to respondents 
Edith Cowan University 
School of Computer and Information Science 
My name is Sue Webb and I am an Honours student at Edith Cowan University. 
I am investigating security tool usage in wireless networks for my Honours 
thesis. 
I would like your organisation to participate in my research by taking part in an 
interview survey. Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw 
at any time. 
In order to protect your privacy the interview survey has been designed so that 
the processed data will not identify any individual participant. Each survey is 
marked with a respondent number and I am the only person with access to the list 
matching respondent numbers to individual organisations/respondents. Please 
also note that the results received will only be accessible by me and any 
computerised documents related to this research will be stored in an encrypted 
fonnat, also accessible only by me. This survey has been cleared by the 
University Ethics Board. 
Please read and sign the consent fonn attached to the front. Once the survey is 
complete and the results are compiled, I will make those results available to you. 
Please direct any questions about the survey to me at the 
School of Computer and Infonnation Science 
Mount Lawley Campus 
Edith Cowan University 
2 Bradford Street 
MT LAWLEY WA 6050 
Email: swebb(iilstudent.ecu.edu.au 
Phone:  
It should take between 20 and 30 minutes to complete the interview. 
With thanks for your participation 
Sue Webb 
School of Computer and lnfonnation Science 
August, 2002 
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Respondent consent form 
Response Number __ 
Consent Form 
I have read the covering letter relating to the collection of data for the purpose of 
investigating security tool usage in wireless networks. I recognise the purpose of 
the data collection and I appreciate that my participation is voluntary. 
I understand that my response will be kept confidential and that no person other 
than the researcher (Sue Webb) will have any means of identifying me or my 
organisation from the published results. 
I hereby consent to participating in the collection by way of responding to the 
interview survey. 
Signed: .................................................................. .. 
Full Name: .............................................................. . 
Position: ................... , ............................................. .. 
Organisation: ........................................................... . 
Date: .. ./ ... .12002 
II 0 
•, ., 
Interview survey instrument 
Sectio11 A -All respo11de11ts 
1) Has your organisation tested and/or implemented any 802.llb 
WLAN technology? 
No 
0 (Go to Section B) 
2) Are you aware of any security implications of using WLANs? 
Yes No 
Cl If yes, please specify 0 (Go to question 4) 
3) How were you made aware of the implications? (Select as many as 
applicable) 
WLAN hardware vendor 0 
Colleague(s) 0 
Print media 0 
Mailing list 0 
Security Internet site 0 
Other, general Internet site 0 
Other please specify 0 
Ill 
4) Have you enabled WEP? (Yes I No) 
No 
D 
5) Are you aware of any design flaws that allow hackers to decipher 
WEP-encrypted data? 
I~ 
6) Have you employed other encryption tools? 
Yes No 
D If yes, please specify D 
7) Have you employed any other security tools? 
Yes No 
D If yes, please specify D 
Go to Section C 
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Sectio11 B- No c11rre111 WLAN implemel!tatioll 
8) Does your organisation ir~tend to test and/or implement any 802.11b 
WLAN technology in the next 12 months? 
[~ 
9) Are you aware of any security implications of using WLANs? 
Yes No 
CJ If yes, please specify 1:1 (Go to question 11) 
10) How were you made aware of these implkations? (select as many as 
applicable) 
WLAN hardware vendor 1:1 
Colleague(s) 1:1 
Print media 1:1 
Mailing list 1:1 
Security Internet site 1:1 
-
Other, general Internet site 1:1 
Other- please specify 1:1 
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11) Has your awareness of these security implications affected your 
decisions about testing and/or implementfng WLAN technology? 
Yes No 
IJ If yes, please specify how CJ 
12) What reasons (other than security implicaUons) do you have for not 
testing/implementing WLAN technology? 
Go to Section C 
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Section C-All Respondents- Demograpltic Questiolls 
13) What type of organisation would you classify your organisation as? 
Consulting- please specify Cl 
Finance Cl 
Government Cl 
Law Cl 
Mining Cl 
Retail- please specify Cl 
Technology Cl 
Training Cl 
Other - please specify Cl 
14) How many network nodes (wired or wireless) are deployed in your 
organisation? 
<10 11-25 26-50 51-100 100+ 
Cl Cl Cl Cl Cl 
Thank you very much for taking the time to complete 
this survey. Once again, please be assured that your 
identity and that of your organisation will remain 
confidential. 
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Appendix C - Final scan route for phase 1 
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Map is a composite made from individual maps downloaded from http://www.whereis.com.au 
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